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INTRODUCTION

President Barack Obama described economic inequality as the “defining
challenge of our time.”2 He argued that “[t]he combined trends of increased
inequality and decreasing mobility pose a fundamental threat to the American
Dream, [and] our way of life.”3 And he is not alone in viewing inequality as an
existential threat to both our society and our democracy. 4 But why is economic
inequality so harmful? How did we become the most unequal advanced
democracy in the world? What could or should the government do about the
problem? This Article attempts to answer all of those questions. It ultimately
argues that our government has a fundamental responsibility to limit the amount
of inequality in society and that the best way to do this is to place a constitutional
limit on the government’s ability to increase wealth inequality.
The concept of inequality is central to this Article, so it makes sense to
begin by defining it. In a general sense, inequality just means a “difference in
size, degree, [or] circumstances.”5 Of course, there are many kinds of inequality,
not all of which have a profound impact on our lives. Some kinds of inequality

Full Transcript: President Obama’s December 4 Remarks on the Economy, WASH. POST,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/running-transcript-president-obamas-december-4remarks-on-the-economy/2013/12/04/7cec31ba-5cff-11e3-be07006c776266ed_story.html?noredirect=on (last visited Sept. 1, 2019).
3
Id. President Obama’s quote implies that increasing inequality and decreasing social
mobility are separate issues. In fact, they are related. High levels of inequality decrease social
mobility. See infra text accompanying notes 70–71.
2

4

See Kate E. Pickett & Richard G. Wilkinson, Income Inequality and Health: A Causal
Review, 128 SOC. SCI. & MED. 316, 316 (2015) (noting that various world leaders, including the
U.S. President, the Pope, and the U.K. Prime Minister have all identified inequality as one of the
most important problems of our time); see also Eduardo Porter, Income Inequality Is Costing the
U.S. on Social Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2015, at B1 (“The bloated incarceration rates and rockbottom life expectancy, the unraveling families and the stagnant college graduation rates amount
to an existential threat to the nation’s future.”).
5
Inequality, NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010).
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are very important, however. Legal scholars, for example, have written
extensively about the effects of racial and gender inequality.6 While these are
important forms of inequality, this Article focuses on a different kind of
inequality: economic inequality, specifically wealth inequality. Wealth
inequality has not been the focus of as much legal scholarship as other forms of
inequality.7 It has, however, been extensively studied in fields like economics,
political science, sociology, psychology, and public health.8 That research
demonstrates that the adverse consequences of high economic inequality are
profound. Highly unequal societies have slower economic growth than more
equal societies.9 High economic inequality also causes a wide variety of health
problems, including lower life expectancies, higher infant mortality rates, and
higher rates of mental illness.10 It is associated with numerous societal problems,
including lower rates of trust, lower social cohesion, and higher rates of violent
crime.11 There is also growing evidence that high levels of inequality result in
environmental degradation.12 Finally, high rates of inequality undermine
democracy.13
High rates of economic inequality do not just mean that some people
have more money than others. The consequences of high levels of inequality are
stark. It undermines the economy, society, public health, and even democracy
itself. Our government has a duty to maintain the economy, society, public
health, and its own democratic character.14 By undermining the general welfare,

For example, the phrase “gender discrimination” has appeared in the titles of 135 law review
articles. The phrase “racial discrimination” has appeared in the titles of 338 articles. By
comparison, the phrase “economic inequality” has appeared in the titles of 58 articles, and the
specific phrase “wealth inequality” has appeared in the title of only 19 articles. All searches were
conducted using LexisAdvance on September 1, 2019. Searches were conducted on those
documents appearing in the “Law Reviews and Journals” database.
6

7
See supra note 6. Having said that, some of the most relevant legal contributions to this field
include the following: Kate Andrias, Separations of Wealth: Inequality and the Erosion of Checks
and Balances, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 419 (2015); Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminism and Economic
Inequality, 35 LAW & INEQ. 265 (2017); Brendan A. Cappiello, The Price of Inequality and the
2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, 17 N.C. BANKING INST. 401
(2013); John J. Chung, Wealth Inequality as Explained by Quantitative Easing and Law’s Inertia,
85 UMKC L. REV. 275 (2017); Stephen M. Feldman, The End of the Cold War: Can American
Constitutionalism Survive Victory?, 41 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 261 (2015); Thomas W. Mitchell,
Growing Inequality and Racial Economic Gaps, 56 HOW. L.J. 849 (2013).
8
See infra Part III (describing the extensive literature on economic inequality in other fields).
9
10
11
12
13
14

See infra Section III.C.
See infra Section III.D.
See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III.E.
See infra Section III.B.
See infra Part V.
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high economic inequality becomes a proper subject of governmental action.15
Thus, the government should take action to rein in high levels of economic
inequality before it undermines society as a whole.
It should not come as a surprise to anyone that the U.S. is currently
experiencing extremely high levels of economic inequality. Rates of economic
inequality have been growing since the 1980s and have now reached levels not
seen since the “Gilded Age” of the 1920s.16 This is not a singularly U.S.
affliction. Economic inequality has been growing all over the world.17 But the
U.S. has higher levels of inequality than any other advanced democracy.18 The
consequences of that can be seen everywhere. As predicted by the research on
economic inequality, the U.S. has a lower life expectancy, higher infant mortality
rates, and higher rates of violent crime than more equal countries.19 In some
ways, living in the U.S. today is more like living in a developing country than a
rich nation.20 And as inequality continues to increase, the effects are likely to
grow worse. Economic inequality now represents an existential threat to U.S.
society.21
It is for this reason that this Article proposes amending the Constitution
to limit further increases in wealth inequality.22 To be clear, this proposed
Amendment does not try to simply eliminate or outlaw inequality. Rather, it
imposes an obligation on the U.S. government to assess the impact on wealth
inequality of any new laws or rules.23 It then prohibits the government from
passing laws that increase inequality unless the government identifies an
important governmental purpose that justifies that increase.24 While this will not
automatically eliminate existing inequality, it would make it very unlikely that
wealth inequality will continue to increase. And, in the long run, it will probably
lead to lower levels of wealth inequality.25 This would result in greater trust in
government and society, better public health, and greater economic growth. It
would, in effect, make the U.S. a better place to live for everybody.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II defines the various forms of
economic inequality. Part III summarizes the research on economic inequality
across a number of different fields. The state of inequality in the U.S. today is

15

See infra Part V.

16

See infra Part IV.
See infra text accompanying note 157.

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

See infra text accompanying note 147.
See infra text accompanying notes 158–164.
See infra text accompanying notes 176–186.
See supra text accompanying notes 2–4.
See infra Part VI.
See infra Section VI.B.
See infra Section VI.F.
See infra text accompanying notes 229–235.
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examined in Part IV. Part V explains why it is necessary for the government to
take an active role in limiting wealth inequality. Part VI proposes an Amendment
to the Constitution to address the threat of rising wealth inequality and discusses
the provisions of the proposed Amendment. This Article’s conclusions are
presented in Part VII.
II. DEFINING INEQUALITY
There are three different kinds of inequality discussed in this Article:
income inequality, wealth inequality, and economic inequality. While the
inequality literature sometimes treats these terms as being interchangeable, they
have distinct meanings.
Income inequality refers to differences in income between different
members of a society. Income is usually defined as all money earned by a
household (including cash transfers like food stamps or tax credits) in a given
year minus any taxes paid.26 Income inequality is usually measured either using
a Gini coefficient or the P90/P10 ratio.27 The Gini coefficient for income
inequality represents the amount of inequality as a number between zero (perfect
equality—everyone has the same income) and one (perfect inequality—one
person has all the income).28 Higher Gini coefficients indicate higher levels of
inequality. Income inequality is also sometimes expressed in terms of the
P90/P10 ratio. This compares the income of the person at the 90th percentile of
the income distribution to the person at the 10th percentile of the income
distribution.29 The greater the ratio of the income of the 90th percentile to the
10th percentile, the more unequal the distribution of income in society.
Wealth inequality focuses on differences in overall wealth rather than
differences in income. Wealth is defined as total assets owned by a household
minus debts or liabilities.30 It includes pension wealth.31 Wealth inequality is also
measured using both the Gini coefficient and the P90/P10 ratio.32 The higher the

26

See, e.g., Jonathan Fisher & Timothy M. Smeeding, Income Inequality, PATHWAYS: A MAG.
POVERTY, INEQ. & SOC. POL’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE), 2016, at 32; OECD, OECD FACTBOOK 20112012: ECONOMIC, ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL STATISTICS 80 (2011).
27
Fisher & Smeeding, supra note 26.
ON

28
29

Id.
Id. at 32–34.

30

Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913:
Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data, 131 Q.J. ECON. 519, 525 (2016) (“Wealth is the
current market value of all the assets owned by households net of all their debts.”); Gabriel
Zucman, Wealth Inequality, PATHWAYS: A MAG. ON POVERTY, INEQ. & SOC. POL’Y (SPECIAL
ISSUE), 2016, at 39.
31
Saez & Zucman, supra note 30, at 525–26; Zucman, supra note 30.
32

ratio).

See supra text accompanying notes 27–29 (describing the Gini coefficient and the P90/P10
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Gini coefficient or the P90/P10 ratio the more unequally wealth is distributed in
a given society. Wealth inequality is generally much higher than income
inequality.33 This is because income inequality has a “snowballing effect” on
wealth inequality as those with the highest incomes save at higher rates.34 This
“snowballing effect” has dramatically affected the distribution of wealth in the
U.S. since the late 1970s.35
Income inequality and wealth inequality measure different things,
although both can be used as proxies for economic inequality. In terms of
understanding the real level of inequality in the U.S., however, wealth inequality
is a better measure of overall inequality than income inequality. There are several
reasons to focus on wealth inequality. First, the correlation between income and
wealth is low, suggesting that the impact of wealth inequality is separate from
the impact of income inequality.36 In addition, there are benefits associated with
wealth that do not necessarily accrue to income, like long-term financial
security.37 Moreover, wealth inequality is significantly higher than income
inequality.38 Thus looking only at income inequality will tend to underestimate
the overall level of inequality in society. And finally, at least for some problems,
wealth inequality appears to have worse consequences than income inequality.39
For these reasons, wealth inequality is a better measure of overall inequality than
income inequality because it more accurately captures the true state of economic
inequality in the U.S.40
As a result, this Article will focus on the effects of wealth inequality
where possible. However, less is known about wealth inequality than income
inequality because there is less reliable data about wealth inequality.41 So, even

33

See Kathryn N. Neckerman & Florencia Torche, Inequality: Causes and Consequences, 33
ANN. REV. SOC. 335, 338 (2007) (“Wealth is much more unequally distributed than income.”);
Saez & Zucman, supra note 30 at 521; see also Mitchell, supra note 7, at 856.
34
See Saez & Zucman, supra note 30, at 531.
35

Id. at 521.
See Lisa A. Keister & Stephanie Moller, Wealth Inequality in the United States, 26 ANN.
REV. SOC. 63, 65 (2000) (“Omitting wealth from studies of inequality leaves an important part of
the . . . story untold.”); Alexandra Killewald et al., Wealth Inequality and Accumulation, 43 ANN.
REV. SOC. 379, 390 (2017) (“Thus, our results also confirm that . . . wealth remains distinct, even
from long-term measures of income.”).
36

37
38

See Keister & Moller, supra note 36, at 64.
See supra text accompanying note 33.

39

See infra text accompanying note 116 (finding that wealth inequality produces a greater drag
on economic growth than income inequality).
See Cappiello, supra note 7, at 403–04 (arguing that wealth inequality is “more problematic”
than income inequality); Keister & Moller, supra note 36, at 64 (noting that “recent evidence
suggests that inequality is much worse if wealth is taken into account”).
41
See Facundo Alvaredo et al., WORLD INEQUALITY REPORT 2018, at 206 (“Unfortunately
relatively little is . . . known about the recent evolution of wealth inequality at a global level.
Wealth inequality data discussed in public debates up to now essentially relied on sources which
40

2019]

WEALTH INEQUALITY AMENDMENT

7

though wealth inequality is a better measure of overall inequality, this Article
will also cite research that discusses the effects of income inequality.
Economic inequality is a broader concept than either income inequality
or wealth inequality and includes the totality of ways in which people’s economic
opportunities are different.42 Income and wealth inequality make up a large part
of economic inequality, but it also includes other ways in which people’s
economic opportunities are different.43 Economic inequality (in its broadest
sense) is difficult to measure, however, and it is most often measured by
differences in income or wealth.44 For that reason, the literature often treats
economic inequality as being synonymous with income or wealth inequality.45
The lax approach to terminology in the literature is somewhat
problematic. Economic inequality is broader than income or wealth inequality,
but this Article will follow the convention in the literature and treat all three
terms as being largely synonymous, at least when discussing that literature (i.e.,
in Part III). But when it comes to discussing the proposed constitutional
amendment (i.e., in Part VI), this Article will use specific terms rather than
do not allow for a sound analysis of wealth dynamics.”); Keister & Moller, supra note 36, at 64
(noting that income is “the most commonly studied indicator of financial wellbeing” because of
the availability of “accurate data on wages and salaries”).
42

See Hari Bapuji, Individuals, Interactions and Institutions: How Economic Inequality
Affects Organizations, 68 HUM. REL. 1059, 1061 (2015) (noting that economic inequality
represents a “broader conceptualization” than income or wealth inequality and could include
inequalities in opportunities, education, health or social status); Amartya K. Sen, From Income
Inequality to Economic Inequality, 64 S. ECON. J. 384, 398 (1997) (arguing that economic
inequality is broader than income inequality and includes “influences on individual well-being and
freedom that are economic in nature but that are not captured by the simple statistics of incomes
and commodity holdings.”); How Is Economic Inequality Defined?, EQUALITY TR.,
https://www.equalitytrust.org.uk/how-economic-inequality-defined (last visited Sept. 1, 2019).
43
Cf. Bartlett, supra note 7, at 284–85 (discussing the difference between poverty and
economic inequality).
44
See How Is Economic Inequality Defined?, supra note 42; see also Nancy Bermeo, Does
Electoral Democracy Boost Economic Equality?, 20 J. DEMOCRACY 21, 22 (2009) (defining
economic inequality as “a measure of the distribution of material resources that emerges from the
ranking of all the economic actors . . . according to the amount of material resources that they
possess”).
See, e.g., Bapuji, supra note 42, at 1061 (“It is common to find economic inequality being
used interchangeably with income inequality and wealth inequality . . . .”); Stéphane Côté et al.,
High Economic Inequality Leads Higher-Income Individuals to Be Less Generous, 112 PNAS
15838, 15838 (2015) (defining economic inequality as “the extent to which wealth is concentrated
in the hands of a small proportion of the population”); B. Keith Payne et al., Economic Inequality
Increases Risk Taking, 114 PNAS 4643, 4643 (2017) (defining inequality as “the variance in an
income distribution (as is measured using measures such as the Gini coefficient)”); Frederick Solt,
Economic Inequality and Democratic Political Engagement, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 48, 51–52 (2008)
[hereinafter Solt, Democratic Political Engagement] (treating income inequality as a measure of
economic inequality). But see Sen, supra note 42, at 384–85 (arguing that economic inequality is
significantly broader than income inequality and that the focus on income inequality is an
“inadequate” way of assessing economic inequality).
45
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treating all three forms of inequality as if they are interchangeable. In particular,
it will focus on wealth inequality rather than the related concept of economic
inequality.
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIGH LEVELS OF INEQUALITY
This section will review the literature about the effects of economic
inequality. Economic inequality has been studied across many fields and this
section attempts to synthesize that vast and diverse body of work. The papers
discussed below come from a variety of different fields including economics,
political science, sociology, psychology, public health, and ecology.
Moreover, the discussion below focuses on empirical studies of the
effects of inequality. This is important because it is often possible to come up
with multiple plausible predictions about the effect of inequality. For example,
in political science, there has been a debate about the effect of inequality on
voting.46 One hypothesis is that as economic inequality increases, the rich will
dominate the political agenda, which will push issues that affect the poor off the
agenda, and ultimately result in lower voting rates among poorer citizens.47
Another competing hypothesis is that as inequality widens, the increasing
differences between rich and poor will motivate poorer citizens to vote in larger
numbers.48 Both theories seem plausible, but they can’t both be true. The only
way to know which hypothesis holds true in the real world is to test them against
the evidence.
As it turns out, the evidence indicates that increased economic inequality
reduces voting by the poorest members of society.49 But in the absence of
evidence, both theories sound like they could be true. This highlights the need
not just for plausible theories about the effects of inequality but also for empirical
methods that test those theories. For that reason, this section focuses on empirical
work (i.e., articles that test their theories against the evidence, often using
statistical methods to do so). As a result, the discussion below is both multidisciplinary and empirical in its approach.
There are many ways one could divide and categorize the ways in which
inequality harms society. This Article has opted to classify them under five
headings: societal effects, democratic effects, effects on economic growth, public

46
See Frederick Solt, Does Economic Inequality Depress Electoral Participation? Testing the
Schattschneider Hypothesis, 32 POL. BEHAV. 285, 286–88 (2010) [hereinafter Solt, Testing the
Schattschneider Hypothesis] (describing different theories about how inequality could affect
voting patterns).
47
Id. at 286–87.
48

Id. at 288.
Id. at 294–97; see also Solt, Democratic Political Engagement, supra note 45, at 57 (noting
that high levels of inequality depress electoral participation by the poor rather than increasing
support for redistribution).
49
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health effects, and environmental effects. Each subsection below addresses one
of those groupings.
A. The Effect of Inequality on Society
There are numerous ways in which inequality tears at the fabric of
society. Inequality is associated with lower levels of social cohesion.50 For
example, studies show that people in more unequal societies show higher levels
of status anxiety and lower levels of trust.51 They also show lower levels of
concern for social harmony and are less willing to help others.52 Higher levels of
inequality also result in less participation in civic life.53 And, as inequality has
increased, our neighborhoods have been economically segregated as the wealthy
increasingly live apart from both the middle class and the poor.54 Finally, it seems
that the more unequal the society, the less happy its members.55
And the adverse effects extend beyond a general decrease in trust, civic
participation, and happiness. For example, increases in inequality cause increases
in violent crime.56 This finding may seem startling, but it has been replicated

50
See Pickett & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 322–23. For an excellent discussion of the
relationship between inequality, trust, and social cohesion, see Bo Rothstein & Eric M. Uslaner,
All for All: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust, 58 WORLD POL. 41, 41–53 (2005).
51

See Pickett & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 323; see also Nicholas R. Buttrick & Shigehiro
Oishi, The Psychological Consequences of Income Inequality, 11 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL.
COMPASS 1, 2 (2017) (“Surveys show that the more the income inequality in a given area, the less
the members of that area trust each other.” (citation omitted)); Rothstein & Uslaner, supra note 50,
at 47–48 & fig.1 (showing that there is a strong relationship between high levels of inequality and
lower trust across societies).
52
53

See Pickett & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 323.
See Buttrick & Oishi, supra note 51, at 3.

See Neckerman & Torche, supra note 33, at 344 (“Although inequality across regions has
declined, the affluent and the poor have become more segregated from each other across
metropolitan areas, municipalities, and neighborhoods.”).
55
See Buttrick & Oishi, supra note 51, at 5 (noting that studies have found that high inequality
is associated with lower levels of happiness within society); Neckerman & Torche, supra note 33,
at 342–43 (noting that studies have found that high inequality is correlated with lower levels of life
satisfaction).
56
See Mario Coccia, Economic Inequality Can Generate Unhappiness that Leads to Violent
Crime in Society, 4 INT’L J. HAPPINESS & DEV. 1, 5 (2018) (noting that “there is a growing
consensus” that inequality can cause increases in violent crime); Pablo Fajnzylber et al., Inequality
and Violent Crime, 45 J.L. & ECON. 1 (2002) (“Crime rates and inequality are positively correlated
within countries and, particularly, between countries, and this correlation reflects causation from
inequality to crime rates, even after controlling for other crime determinants.”); see also Hector
Gutierrez Rufrancos et al., Income Inequality and Crime: A Review and Explanation of the TimeSeries Evidence, 1 SOC. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2013) (finding a strong correlation between income
inequality and violent crime).
54
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many times.57 And it is not just violent crime that is affected by inequality.
Property crime is also “very strongly” related to income inequality.58 As one
researcher has noted, a decrease in income inequality “is associated with a
sizeable reduction in crime.”59
High levels of inequality are also correlated with poor educational
outcomes for children. In one study of 23 high-income countries, higher
inequality was associated with lower math scores, lower reading scores, lower
science scores, and lower enrollment in higher education.60 The same is true in
the U.S., where educational performance decreases and the likelihood of
dropping out of school increases as income inequality increases.61 Nor is the
effect on children limited to education. Across high-income countries, high
levels of inequality are negatively correlated with child wellbeing as a whole
(i.e., as inequality increases child wellbeing decreases).62
Unequal societies also cause rich people to become less generous to
others.63 Research indicates that the rich show higher levels of entitlement and
narcissism,64 as well as a greater tendency to engage in self-serving unethical
behavior.65 This may be related to the finding, discussed below, that increasing
inequality increases corruption.66 Higher inequality is also associated with higher

57
See Neckerman & Torche, supra note 33, at 343 (noting that “[m]any but not all of these
studies find crime rates are higher in areas with higher income inequality”); Pickett & Wilkinson,
supra note 4, at 318 (noting that this finding has been replicated many times).
58
59

Rufrancos et al., supra note 56.
Id.

60

See Kate E. Pickett & Richard G. Wilkinson, Child Wellbeing and Income Inequality in Rich
Societies: Ecological Cross Sectional Study, 335 BRIT. MED. J. 1080 (2007) [hereinafter Ecological
Cross Sectional Study]. Not all of the findings were statistically significant, but the results for the
math scores and further education were significant. Even for the ones that were not significant,
however, it is striking that all of the educational variables were negatively correlated with
inequality (i.e., as inequality increased educational attainment decreased).
61
62
63

Id.
Id.

See Côté et al., supra note 45.
See Paul K. Piff, Wealth and the Inflated Self: Class, Entitlement, and Narcissism, 40
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 34 (2013).
65
See Paul K. Piff et al., Higher Social Class Predicts Increased Unethical Behavior, 109
PNAS 4086 (2012). This may also be a function of lower levels of trust within society. See Buttrick
& Oishi, supra note 51, at 3 (“People who trust others less are more likely to engage in unethical
behavior . . . .”).
66
See infra text accompanying notes 101–103.
64
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levels of risk taking.67 For example, highly unequal societies have higher rates
of drug use68 and gambling.69
Greater inequality also decreases social mobility.70 This means that
children of poor parents are more likely to become poor adults, while the children
of rich parents are likely to remain rich.71 As a result, “rags to riches” life
trajectories are much less common in highly unequal societies. And inequality
has enormous adverse public health effects, which are discussed below.72 By
virtually any measure (crime, happiness, social cohesion and trust, social
mobility, drug use, child wellbeing, etc.) unequal societies are worse places to
live than more equal societies.
B. The Effect of Inequality on Democracy
High levels of economic inequality also have wide-ranging impacts on
the health of our democracy. To begin with, higher levels of inequality lower the
rate at which people vote in the U.S.73 Moreover, the effects are asymmetrical.
High levels of inequality decrease voting rates of the poorest more than rates for
the wealthiest.74 While the composition of the electorate is always skewed in
favor of the wealthy (who vote at higher rates than the poor at all levels of
inequality), this trend becomes even more pronounced as economic inequality
increases.75 High levels of inequality also decrease both interest in politics and
discussion of politics, particularly for the poorest members of society.76
Highly unequal societies also have less trust in democratic
government.77 While this result is not unique to the U.S., there is evidence that
high levels of inequality are undermining our commitment to democracy. For

67
68

See Payne et al., supra note 45.
See Pickett & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 320.

69
See Elizabeth A. Freund & Irwin L. Morris, Gambling and Income Inequality in the States,
24 POL’Y STUD. J. 265 (2006).
70
See Miles Corak, Income Inequality, Equality of Opportunity, and Intergenerational
Mobility, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 79 (2013); Pickett & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 321.
71
72

Mitchell, supra note 7, at 851.
See infra Section III.D.

73
See Solt, Testing the Schattschneider Hypothesis, supra note 46, at 294–97 (finding that
states with the highest levels of inequality in the study had voting rates approximately 20% lower
than states with the lowest levels of inequality).
74
Id. at 294–97; see also Solt, Democratic Political Engagement, supra note 45, at 56–57.
75
76
77

See Solt, Testing the Schattschneider Hypothesis, supra note 46, at 294–297.
See Solt, Democratic Political Engagement, supra note 45, at 54–56.

See Roberto Stefan Foa & Yascha Mounk, The End of the Consolidation Paradigm: A
Response to Our Critics, J. DEMOCRACY, June 24, 2017, at 1, 15 fig.5 (showing that there is a strong
correlation between income inequality and attitudes towards democracy with the electorate in
highly unequal societies becoming increasingly disenchanted with democracy).
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example, satisfaction with U.S. democracy is declining over time, particularly
amongst the young.78 By 2011, less than 30% of young Americans thought that
democracy was a good way to run the country.79 In response to a 2016 survey,
46% of respondents said they had “never had” faith in U.S. democracy or had
“lost” that faith.80 This suggests that growing inequality is an existential threat to
democracy itself.81
A big part of the problem is that our government has been captured by
moneyed interests. It is much more responsive to the needs of the rich than the
needs of the middle class or the poor.82 This has occurred, in part, because the
wealthy are more politically active than those who are less well off, but also
because they give far more money to politicians and political organizations and
have far more access to public officials.83 The influence of the affluent might not

78
79

Id. at fig.1.
Id.

80

Id. at 6.
Id. at 3–5 (arguing that stable democracies can “deconsolidate”—transition to a
non-democratic form of government—if support for democracy becomes too low); id. at 17 (noting
that “countries in which more than 20 percent of respondents express cynicism of democratic
governance have, historically, been highly susceptible to the rise of authoritarian parties,
candidates and political movements”).
81

82
See Bermeo, supra note 44, at 25 (2009) (noting that “a raft of convincing research shows
that public policies more often reflect the preferences of the wealthy than those of the average
voter” (citation omitted)); Martin Gilens, Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness, 69 PUB.
OPINION Q. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 778 (2005) (finding that the government is very responsive to the
policy preferences of the wealthy and almost totally unresponsive to the policy preferences of poor
and middle-income people when their policy preferences diverge from those of the wealthy);
Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups,
and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564, 572 (2014) (finding that average citizens have “little
or no independent influence on policy” while economic elites have a “substantial, highly
significant, independent impact on policy”); Neckerman & Torche, supra note 33, at 345 (noting
that “elected officials in the United States are far more responsive to their affluent constituents than
to the middle class or the poor”); Benjamin I. Page et al., Democracy and the Policy Preferences
of Wealthy Americans, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 51, 51 (2013) (noting that there is now significant
evidence that “the wealthiest Americans exert more political influence than their less fortunate
fellow citizens do”); cf. Lawrence R. Jacobs & Benjamin I. Page, Who Influences U.S. Foreign
Policy?, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 107, 120–21 (2005) (finding that business leaders have a “strong,
consistent, and perhaps lopsided influence” on U.S. foreign policy while the views of the public
have “little or no significant effect on government officials.”).
83
See Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics: Public Policy, Political
Organization, and the Precipitous Rise of Top Incomes in the United States, 38 POL. & SOC’Y 152,
175–78 (2010) (noting that beginning in the mid-1970s moneyed business interests became very
successful at organizing in ways that permitted them to influence the policy-making process in the
United States through both direct giving to politicians and through massive spending on lobbying
efforts); Page et al., supra note 82, at 53–54; Jeffrey A. Winters & Benjamin I. Page, Oligarchy in
the United States?, 7 PERSP. ON POL. 731, 740–43 (2009) (describing ways in which the wealthy
are able to influence government policy, including lobbying).
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be a huge problem if the wealthiest Americans and poor to middle-class
Americans agreed on the role of government,84 but they do not.85
The wealthiest Americans say that budget deficits are the most important
problem facing the U.S.86 And they would prefer to cut government spending on
Social Security, food stamps, health care, and environmental protection.87 Most
Americans do not agree. They see jobs and the economy as the most important
issue,88 and support increasing government spending on Social Security, health
care, and the environment.89
There are also significant differences on tax policy. The wealthiest
Americans do not want to increase the marginal income tax rate or the estate
tax.90 In contrast, most Americans support a higher marginal income tax rate on
the wealthy as well as an increase in the estate tax.91 Finally, the wealthiest
Americans are adamantly opposed to having the government take active steps to
reduce economic inequality in the U.S.92

84
See Page et al., supra note 82, at 52 (noting that “[i]f . . . the policy preferences of the
affluent were much the same as everyone else’s, then their unequal influence would make little
practical difference” (citation omitted)).
85

See generally Page et al., supra note 82 (finding that the views of the wealthiest Americans
diverge from those of the public); see also Hacker & Pierson, supra note 83, at 181–82 (2010)
(noting that wealthy Americans are “less supportive of economic redistribution and measures to
provide economic security” than the median voter).
86
87

See Page et al., supra note 82, at 55.
Id. at 56.

88

Id. at 55–56.
Id. at 56; see also Little Public Support for Reductions in Federal Spending, PEW RES. CTR.
(Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.people-press.org/2019/04/11/little-public-support-for-reductions-infederal-spending/ (finding that large numbers of Americans support increases in spending for
Medicare, health care, and Social Security, while very few Americans support reducing spending
on those areas).
89

90

See Page et al., supra note 82, at 61–62.
Id. at 62; see also Matthew Sheffield, Poll: A Majority of Americans Support Raising the
Top Tax Rate to 70 Percent, HILL (Jan. 15, 2019), https://thehill.com/hilltv/what-americasthinking/425422-a-majority-of-americans-support-raising-the-top-tax-rate-to-70 (reporting on a
recent public opinion poll that showed nearly 60% of registered voters favored increasing the
highest marginal income tax rate to 70%); Growing Partisan Divide Over Fairness of the Nation’s
Tax System, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.people-press.org/2019/04/04/growingpartisan-divide-over-fairness-of-the-nations-tax-system/ (showing that a majority of American
believe the U.S. tax system is not fair and that more than 60% of Americans believe that the wealthy
and
corporations
do
not
pay
enough
in
taxes);
Taxes,
GALLUP,
https://news.gallup.com/poll/1714/taxes.aspx (last visited Sept. 1, 2019) (showing that, in public
opinion polls conducted over more than twenty five years, a majority of Americans consistently
indicate that “upper-income people” and “corporations” pay too little in federal taxes).
92
See Page et al., supra note 82, at 63–64 (noting that 87% of the wealthy said that the
government did not have a responsibility to reduce inequality and that 83% of the wealthy said that
the government should not use taxes to redistribute wealth).
91
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While there are some areas of agreement,93 the wealthiest Americans
have significantly different views from average Americans about a number of
important issues, including the deficit, health care and Social Security spending,
and tax policy. Moreover, the differences become stronger the richer you are.
Americans with more than $40 million in wealth were significantly more likely
to favor cutting social programs and reducing regulation of businesses than those
with only $5 million in wealth.94 As Professor Page suggests, these differences
in views and the ability to influence the government help explain why marginal
tax rates have gone down and cutting Social Security always seems to be on the
agenda, despite the fact that these policies do not have widespread support.95
The wealthiest Americans have been very successful at securing policies
that advance their wealth and blocking proposals that would reduce that wealth.96
Average tax rates, particularly for the wealthiest Americans, have dropped
dramatically since the 1970s.97 And the research suggests that is the result of
intensive efforts by interest groups funded by the wealthiest Americans, who
have been successful in “keeping tax cuts on the agenda and shaping policy to
focus the gains of tax-policy changes on those at the very top of the income
distribution.”98 The reality of the American political system today is that it is one
in which the wealthy use their influence over policy to channel ever larger
proportions of the country’s wealth to themselves, and the poor and middle class
are largely powerless to prevent it.99
Looking beyond the U.S., high levels of inequality have been linked to
other ills, including more human rights abuses, a greater acceptance of

93

Both the wealthiest Americans and the public as a whole support government spending on
both public infrastructure, scientific research and education. See Page et al., supra note 82, at tbl.1.
94
Page et al., supra note 82, at 64–65.
95
See Page et al., supra note 82, at 68; see also Gilens & Page, supra note 82, at 576 (noting
that “even when fairly large majorities of Americans favor policy change, they generally do not
get it” when those policy changes are opposed by economic elites).
96
See Andrias, supra note 7, at 435–61 (describing how the wealthy have been able to exert
considerable power over the government, particularly over issues that would affect their own
wealth like tax policy or corporate regulation); Feldman, supra note 7, at 312–13 (describing how
corporate interests are able to block or otherwise undermine legislation that would adversely affect
their profitability).
97
98

See Hacker & Pierson, supra note 83, at 184 fig.5.
Id. at 184–85.

99
See id. at 189–92 (noting that wealthy business interests were able to prevent changes that
would have reined in executive compensation and that the rise in executive compensation in the
1990s contributed significantly to inequality); see also Feldman, supra note 7, at 306 (“With
ever-increasing proficiency, corporations manipulate elections and government for their own
advantage—benefiting the respective corporations as well as corporate business in toto.” (citation
omitted)); Growing Partisan Divide Over Fairness of the Nation’s Tax System, supra note 91
(showing that more than 60% of Americans believe that the U.S. economic system unfairly favors
powerful interests at the expense of most Americans).

2019]

WEALTH INEQUALITY AMENDMENT

15

authoritarian rule, more influence peddling, and the erosion of the rule of law.100
One study found that high levels of inequality caused increases in corruption.101
This, in turn, can cause further increases in inequality. 102 “As a result, many
societies are likely to be trapped in vicious circles of inequality and
corruption.”103
Inequality also effects whether democracies rise or fall.104 Greater
inequality in society makes it less likely that countries will transition to a stable
democracy.105 And high levels of inequality are associated with the failure of
young democracies.106 But, inequality is not just a problem for young or
transitional democracies. There is evidence that even stable democracies can be
undermined by high levels of inequality.107 These findings led one scholar to
conclude that “persistently high economic inequality harms the quality of
democracy in profound ways.”108
C. The Effect of Inequality on the Economy
Inequality also affects the economy. There is evidence that highly
unequal societies have lower rates of economic growth than more equal
societies.109 This relationship has been studied extensively over the last several

See Bermeo, supra note 44, at 25; see also Feldman, supra note 7, at 332 (noting that “gross
inequality in a pluralist democratic regime” undermines the rule of law (citation omitted)).
100

101

See Jong-sung You & Sanjeev Khagram, A Comparative Study of Inequality and
Corruption, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 136, 151 (2005) (“Thus, the weight of the evidence supports our
hypothesis that inequality increases corruption.” (citation omitted)).
102
Id. at 153 (“[I]nequality causes higher levels of corruption, and higher levels of corruption
intensify inequality.”).
103
Id.
104

See Florian Jung & Uwe Sunde, Income, Inequality, and the Stability of Democracy—
Another Look at the Lipset Hypothesis, 35 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 52 (2014).
105

See Solt, Democratic Political Engagement, supra note 45, at 52.
See Ethan B. Kapstein & Nathan Converse, Poverty, Inequality and Democracy: Why
Democracies Fail, 19 J. DEMOCRACY 57 (2008).
107
See Foa & Mounk, supra note 77, at fig.5 (noting that there is a strong correlation between
income inequality and attitudes towards democracy with the electorate in highly unequal societies
becoming increasingly disenchanted with democracy).
106

108

Bermeo, supra note 44, at 24; see also Solt, Democratic Political Engagement, supra note
45, at 58.
109

See, e.g., Dierk Herzer & Sebastian Vollmer, Inequality and Growth: Evidence From Panel
Cointegration, 10 J. ECON. INEQ. 489, 501 (2012) (finding that “the long-run effect of inequality
on growth is negative” and that this relationship holds true for rich and poor countries as well as
democratic and non-democratic countries).
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decades.110 While most studies have found a negative relationship between
inequality and growth,111 that result is not universal112 and some of the studies
finding a relationship have been criticized on methodological grounds.113 A
recent meta-analysis by Neves et al., however, re-analyzed the existing empirical
studies of the relationship between inequality and growth.114 While Neves et al.
found some problems with the prior studies,115 their meta-analysis concluded that
inequality does have a negative effect on growth, particularly in developing
countries, and that wealth inequality has a greater negative effect than income
inequality.116
The takeaway from this research is that inequality, particularly wealth
inequality, has a negative impact on economic growth.117 This may be, in part,
because high levels of inequality decrease productivity.118 For example, there is
evidence that high levels of pay inequality within businesses can decrease
cooperation, diminish job satisfaction, hamper innovation, increase turnover, and
have a “negative effect on individual, team and organizational performance.”119
These findings directly contradict an argument frequently made by
wealthy interests that increasing taxes on the wealthy will reduce economic

110

See Pedro Cunha Neves et al., A Meta-Analytic Reassessment of the Effects of Inequality on
Growth, 78 WORLD DEV. 386, 387–88 (2016) (summarizing the history of empirical study of the
relationship between inequality and growth from the mid-1990s to the present).
111
Id. at 390 (noting that 36 of their estimates found a negative relationship between inequality
and growth while only 13 found a positive relationship); see also Erik Thorbecke & Chutatong
Charumilind, Economic Inequality and Its Socioeconomic Impact, 30 WORLD DEV. 1477, 1482
(2002) (reviewing a number of studies that have found a negative correlation between inequality
and economic growth).
112
See, e.g., Robert J. Barro, Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries, 5 J. ECON.
GROWTH 5 (2000) (finding that inequality impeded growth in developing countries but had a
positive correlation with growth in high income countries).
113
See Neves et al., supra note 110.
114

Id. at 388–90 (describing how the data for the meta-analysis was collected).
For example, they found some evidence of publication bias in the magnitude of the results
that may have inflated the reported effect sizes. Id. at 392–93.
116
Id. at 398.
115

117

Id.; see also Andrew Berg et al., Redistribution, Inequality and Growth: New Evidence, 23
J. ECON. GROWTH 259 (2018) (finding that lower inequality is correlated with higher rates of
economic growth); Vicente Royuela et al., The Short-Run Relationship Between Inequality and
Growth: Evidence From the OECD Regions During the Great Recession, 53 REGIONAL STUD.
(forthcoming 2019) (finding a negative relationship between inequality and growth among OECD
countries during the 2003–2013 period).
118
119

See Bapuji, supra note 42, at 1068.
Id.
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growth by reducing the incentive for the rich to earn more.120 In reality,
decreasing taxes on the wealthy increases inequality,121 which leads to lower
growth.122 Thus, the evidence suggests that increasing taxes on the wealthy is a
better route to long-term economic growth because increasing taxes on the
wealthy reduces inequality, and a reduction in inequality will probably lead to
higher long-term growth rates.
D. The Effect of Inequality on Public Health
The health effects of high economic inequality are stark, 123 particularly
in affluent countries like the U.S. Affluent countries with high levels of economic
inequality are simply less healthy than more equal countries.124 Highly unequal
countries suffer from a variety of poor health outcomes including lower life
expectancies, higher infant mortality rates, higher teenage birth rates, higher
rates of drug use, higher rates of obesity, and higher rates of mental illness.125
The size of the effects are large, with high rates of inequality resulting in a
tripling of the rates of mental illness and obesity and years less of life
expectancy.126 This association has been found in hundreds of studies that have
compared outcomes in many countries, at different levels of development, over
a period of more than 30 years.127 As some of the leading researchers in this area
have said: “There can now be no doubt that worse health is . . . associated with
greater inequality.”128 This association is so well known in the public health and

120
See, e.g., Eduardo Porter, Tax Cuts, Sold as Fuel for Growth, Widen Gap Between Rich and
Poor, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/03/business/economy/taxrates-growth.html (describing arguments made in favor of reducing taxes on the wealthy).
121
122

Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 109–116.

123

See Richard G. Wilkinson & Kate E. Pickett, Income Inequality and Social Dysfunction, 35
ANN. REV. SOC. 493, 494 (2009) (reviewing the literature and finding that most of the studies that
have examined the relationship between inequality and health have concluded that increased
inequality is associated with worse health outcomes).
124
See Pickett & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 317–18. This appears to be the case for children
as well as adults, as child wellbeing tends to decrease as inequality increases. See Ecological Cross
Sectional Study, supra note 60.
125
See Pickett & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 320; Wilkinson & Pickett, supra note 123, at 494–
95.
126
See Wilkinson & Pickett, supra note 123, at 494, 505.
127
See Pickett & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 317–18 (describing how hundreds of studies
across a wide variety of countries have shown that countries that are more unequal have poorer
health).
128
Id. at 318.
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epidemiology literature that it even has its own name: “the inequality
hypothesis.”129
But there is not just evidence of association, there is also now “strong”
evidence that inequality causes these adverse health outcomes.130 After several
decades of research, the evidence is clear that the result of increasing inequality
is worse health outcomes for everyone, not just the poor.131 As one researcher
put it, “[i]t appears to be impossible to create a society with high rates of
economic inequality and good health.”132
E. The Effect of Inequality on the Environment
There is a consensus that degradation of the environment can worsen
inequality because the poor are more dependent on the environment than those
who are well off.133 Thus, they suffer more from pollution and climate change
than the wealthy.134 But, increasingly, there is evidence that the causation can
run the other way too—increasing inequality can also have adverse
environmental impacts.135 While not all of the studies agree on whether there is
a relationship,136 there is some evidence that greater inequality is associated with
weaker environmental protection policies and greater biodiversity loss.137 There
is also evidence that highly unequal affluent societies produce more climate
change inducing CO2 emissions than more equal societies.138 While there is need

129
See SV Subramanian & Ichiro Kawachi, Response: In Defence of the Income Inequality
Hypothesis, 32 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1037 (2003).
130
See Pickett & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 323; see also Bapuji, supra note 42, at 1063 (“[I]t
is fair to conclude (based on over 300 peer-reviewed studies) that the relationship between high
levels of income inequality and poor health has met the epidemiological criteria for
causality . . . .”).
131
Pickett & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 322 (noting that studies have found that the adverse
effects of economic inequality, while felt most strongly amongst the poor, “extend to the majority
of the population”); Wilkinson & Pickett, supra note 123, at 505 (noting that the adverse health
and social effects of inequality also impact the top quartile of the population by income).
132
Danny Dorling, The Mother of Underlying Causes – Economic Ranking and Health
Inequality, 128 SOC. SCI. & MED. 327, 330 (2015).
133
See Alexandre Berthe & Luc Elie, Mechanisms Explaining the Impact of Economic
Inequality on Environmental Deterioration, 116 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 191, 191 (2015).
134
Id.
135
136
137

Id.
Id. at tbl.1.

Id. at 198.
See Nicole Grunewald et al., The Trade-Off Between Income Inequality and Carbon Dioxide
Emissions, 142 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 249 (2017) (finding that high levels of inequality increased
carbon dioxide emissions in middle and high income countries); Andrew Jorgenson et al., Domestic
Inequality and Carbon Emissions in Comparative Perspective, 31 SOC. F. 770 (2016) (finding that
inequality is linked with increased carbon emissions in high income countries); Andrew K.
138

2019]

WEALTH INEQUALITY AMENDMENT

19

for additional research in this area,139 increasing economic inequality is likely to
have adverse environmental impacts, particularly in affluent countries like the
United States.140
IV. INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES TODAY
The section above lays out the evidence about the adverse effects of
inequality. Those consequences are profound. Highly unequal societies can
expect to have high crime rates, low social cohesion and happiness, poor public
health, slow economic growth, a poorly functioning democracy, and
environmental degradation. But how bad is inequality in the U.S.? There is good
reason to believe that most people don’t understand how bad it really is.141 This
section briefly reviews the state of inequality in the U.S. today.
Income inequality in the U.S. has grown dramatically since 1980.142 It
has also grown in every state within the U.S. over that same time period.143
Moreover, the more income one has, the more pronounced the changes. While
families in the top 1% of the U.S. population have seen their income more than
double since the 1980s, families in the top 0.1% have seen their income
quadruple over that period.144 Very little of this money has made its way to the
poor or middle class. Between 1979 and 2005, the average incomes of the poorest
quintile of the population increased by only 6% in real terms, while the incomes
of those in the middle quintile increased by only 21%.145 In contrast, the income
of the richest 1% of households increased by more than 230% over that same
period.146 As a result of these changes, the U.S. now has greater income
inequality than any other advanced democracy.147
Jorgenson et al., Income Inequality and Residential Carbon Emissions in the United States: A
Preliminary Analysis, 22 HUM. ECOLOGY REV. 93 (2015) (finding a link between increased
inequality and higher carbon emissions in the United States). But see Sebastian Mader, The Nexus
Between Social Inequality and CO2 Emissions Revisited: Challenging Its Empirical Validity, 89
ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 322 (2018) (arguing that studies showing a positive relationship between
inequality and carbon dioxide emissions are flawed).
139
See Berthe & Elie, supra note 133, at 199.
140

Id.
See Michael I. Norton & Dan Ariely, Building a Better America—One Wealth Quintile at a
Time, 6 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 9 (2011) (finding that most Americans do not understand how
unequal our society has become).
141

142

See Hacker & Pierson, supra note 83, at 155–56; Mitchell, supra note 7, at 853–55;
Neckerman & Torche, supra note 33, at 336–37 (describing the sharp rise in inequality that began
in the late 1980s).
143
See Solt, Testing the Schattschneider Hypothesis, supra note 46, at 290.
144
145
146
147

See Hacker & Pierson, supra note 83, at 155.
Id. at 157.
Id.
Id. at 160; see also id. at fig.2.
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Table 1 below shows the current P90/P10 ratios for all Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) countries.148 The U.S. has
a ratio of 6.3, which puts the U.S. 34th out of 36 countries. The U.S. has worse
income inequality than every country in Europe and is only slightly better than
Chile and Mexico. The OECD also provides information on the Gini coefficients
of income inequality, and the results are essentially the same.149
Table 1 – Income Inequality in OECD Countries
P90/P10 ratio
Denmark
2.9
Czech Republic
3
Finland
3
Iceland
3
Norway
3.1
Slovak Republic
3.1
Slovenia
3.1
Belgium
3.3
Sweden
3.3
France
3.4
Netherlands
3.4
Austria
3.5
Hungary
3.6
Ireland
3.6
Switzerland
3.6
Germany
3.7
Poland
3.7
Luxembourg
4
Canada
4.1
United Kingdom
4.2
Australia
4.3
New Zealand
4.3
Korea
4.4
Italy
4.5
Portugal
4.5
Estonia
4.7
Greece
4.7
Japan
5.2
Latvia
5.3

148
The data was retrieved from the OECD website on Feb. 13, 2019. Income Inequality, OECD
DATA, https://data.oecd.org/inequality/income-inequality.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2019). The
data includes only OECD countries and only data on the P90/P10 ratio.
149
When ranked by Gini coefficients, the U.S. ranks 33rd out of 36 countries. Id. It ranks
marginally above Turkey, but still ranks below the rest of Europe. Id.
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Israel
Turkey
Lithuania
United States
Chile
Mexico
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5.3
5.4
5.7
5.8
6.3
7
7.2

Wealth inequality has moved in the same direction as income
inequality.150 It was very high by the late 1920s but dropped significantly
thereafter to a low in the early 1980s.151 Since the 1980s, wealth inequality has
grown precipitously.152 And while the richest 10% of families have benefited
from this rising inequality, the biggest gains have gone to a relatively small
number of families at the very top—the richest of the rich.153
Today, the wealthiest 0.1% of families in the U.S. own approximately
the same amount of wealth as the bottom 90% of U.S. families put together.154
This means that the 160 thousand richest families have the same total amount of
wealth as the bottom 144 million families.155 Or, to put it another way, the bottom
90% of American families have an average wealth of about $84,000 per family,
while the richest 0.1% have an average wealth of almost $73 million.156 While
wealth inequality has risen globally since the 1980s, wealth inequality in the U.S.
has grown even faster and the U.S. now has some of the highest wealth inequality
in the world, surpassed only by highly unequal countries like Russia.157
The U.S. is one of the richest countries in the world.158 Yet the U.S. is
also one of the most unequal countries.159 The research discussed above in
Section III indicates that, despite our enormous overall wealth, there ought to be

150
See Killewald et al., supra note 36, at 383 tbl.1 (showing that wealth inequality has increased
steadily since the 1980s); see also Keister & Moller, supra note 36, at 67–69 (noting that multiple
studies have shown that wealth inequality is high in the U.S. and that it has worsened in recent
decades).
151
See Saez & Zucman, supra note 30, at 54 fig.6.
152
153
154
155

Id.
Id. at 552.
Id. at 551–52.
Id.

156

Id. at 47 tbl.1.
See Alvaredo et al., supra note 41, at 206–08 fig.4.2.1 (showing that the U.S. has higher
wealth inequality than France, China or the United Kingdom, and only slightly lower wealth
inequality than Russia).
157

158
According to data from the OECD, its per capita GDP is surpassed only by a handful of
countries. See Gross Domestic Product (GDP), OECD DATA, https://data.oecd.org/gdp/grossdomestic-product-gdp.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2019).
159
See supra Table 1.
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serious consequences that stem from that inequality. And there are. The U.S. is
both the most unequal high-income nation and (unsurprisingly) the one with the
worst health and social outcomes.160 For example, our crime rate is much higher
than in other rich democracies.161 In addition, infant mortality rates are high 162
and life expectancy is low.163 And the U.S. does extremely poorly on indicators
of child wellbeing compared to most other rich democracies.164 Overall life
satisfaction in the U.S. is significantly lower than in much of Europe,165 and we
have a worse sense of community as well.166
Social mobility is also lower in the U.S. than in any other rich country.167
But Americans generally do not recognize this and tend to overestimate the

160

See Wilkinson & Pickett, supra note 123, at 497 fig.1.

161

For example, the average homicide rate among OECD countries is 3.6 murders per 100,000
people. See Safety, OECD BETTER LIFE INDEX, http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/topics/safety/
(last visited Aug. 28, 2019). This rate in the US is 4.9 murders per 100,000 people. Id. This puts
the U.S. on par with Chile, which has a murder rate of 4.5 per 100,000. The U.S. is far worse than
the majority of Europe. Id. For example, murder rates in France are 0.6 per 100,000, while murder
rates in Germany are 0.4 per 100,000. Id.
162
The U.S. has 5.9 deaths per 1,000 live births. Infant Mortality Rates, OECD DATA,
https://data.oecd.org/healthstat/infant-mortality-rates.htm#indicator-chart (last visited Aug. 28,
2019). This is essentially the same infant mortality rate as Russia. Id. Most European countries
have much lower rates. For example, the rates in Iceland, Finland, Slovenia, Norway, Estonia,
Sweden, Spain, the Czech Republic, Italy, and Ireland are 3 or less deaths per 1,000 live births. Id.
Essentially, a large number of European states have infant mortality rates half that of the U.S. or
less.
163
Life expectancy at birth in the U.S. is 78.60 years. Life Expectancy at Birth, OECD DATA,
https://data.oecd.org/healthstat/life-expectancy-at-birth.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2019). This is
roughly the same as life expectancy in Poland or the Czech Republic. Id. It is more than three years
less than many European countries, including Switzerland, Spain, Norway, France, and Sweden.
Id. It is also significantly less than many other advanced democracies, including Japan, Australia,
Korea, and Canada.
164
See Pickett & Wilkinson, supra note 60.
165
Life satisfaction scores in the U.S. are significantly worse than in some European countries,
like Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, and Finland. See Life Satisfaction, OECD BETTER LIFE INDEX,
http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/topics/life-satisfaction/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2019). It is better,
however, than some European countries like Greece, Portugal, or Hungary. Id. Overall, the U.S.
ranks 15th out of 38 OECD countries on life satisfaction.
166
According to the OECD, the strength of social networks in the U.S. is relatively low, with
the U.S. ranking 23 out of 38 OECD countries. Community, OECD BETTER LIFE INDEX,
http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/topics/community/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2019). Our results put
us on par with Russia and Japan, and significantly behind Spain, Denmark, Ireland, and Iceland.
Id.

See Neckerman & Torche, supra note 33, at 39 (“In other words, children of poor families
are more likely to remain poor, and the children of wealthy families are more likely to remain
wealthy in the United States than in any other rich country.”); see also Mitchell, supra note 7, at
861–66 (describing the state of social mobility in the U.S. today).
167
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amount of social mobility in our society.168 “Americans believe they live in a
country that is significantly more equal and upwardly mobile than it actually
is.”169 Somewhat ironically, Americans would vastly prefer to live in a country
with the inequality levels of Sweden rather than the U.S.170
The U.S. also has worse public corruption than most European
countries.171 Corruption in the U.S. has been getting worse recently172 and is now
similar to that experienced in the United Arab Emirates or Uruguay.173 U.S.
democracy is also showing signs of poor health.174 According to one prominent
measure of democratic health, the U.S. is ranked far below many European
countries and on par with Belize and Croatia.175 Taken together, these results are
exactly what one would expect from a highly unequal society.
The contrast with Denmark and Norway is particularly illuminating.
Denmark and Norway both have comparable per capita gross domestic product
(“GDP”) to the U.S.176 but have significantly lower income inequality.177 Their

See Shai Davidai & Thomas Gilovich, How Should We Think About Americans’ Beliefs
About Economic Mobility?, 13 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 297, 301 (2018) (finding that
participants, when asked to rank a group of countries by their social mobility, consistently ranked
the U.S. much higher than its actual rank).
169
Id. at 302; see also Mitchell, supra note 7, at 869–71 (describing how Americans
significantly underestimate the amount of inequality in the country).
170
See Norton & Ariely, supra note 141, at 10 (finding that the Americans in their survey
preferred the wealth distribution of Sweden over the U.S. by a rate of 92% to 8%).
171
The U.S. had a corruption score of 71 in the 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index created by
Transparency International. See Corruption Perceptions Index 2018, TRANSPARENCY INT’L,
https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018 (last visited Sept. 19, 2019). The corruption score of the
U.S. is significantly worse than that of countries like Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland.
Id.
168

172

The scores for the U.S. have fallen pretty consistently over the last four years from a score
of 76 in 2015 to 71 in 2018. Id.
173

The U.S. had a corruption score of 71 in 2018. The United Arab Emirates and Uruguay had
scores of 70. Id.
174

See supra Section III.B.
See
Freedom
in
the
World
2018,
FREEDOM
HOUSE,
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2018-table-country-scores (last visited Aug. 29,
2019). The U.S. had an aggregate score of 86 out of 100, the same as Belize and Croatia. Id. Three
European countries received scores of 100 out of 100, and even Canada scored 99 out of 100. Id.
176
Per capita GDP in the U.S. is approximately $58,000 per year. Norway is the same (at
$58,000), while Denmark is slightly lower (at $51,000). See Gross Domestic Product (GDP), supra
note 158.
175

177
See Income Inequality, supra note 148. On February 8, 2019, Norway and Denmark had
Gini coefficients of income inequality of 0.26. The U.S. had a Gini coefficient of 0.39.
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poverty rates are much lower,178 as are their crime rates.179 Life expectancy, on
the other hand, is higher in Denmark and Norway,180 as is social mobility.181 Life
satisfaction is also higher than in the U.S.182 They are less corrupt183 and more
democratic.184 By most measures, Denmark and Norway are simply better places
to live than the U.S.
These differences are not accidents. They are the expected result of the
enormous income and wealth inequality that is present in the U.S. The U.S. may
be one of the wealthiest countries in the world, but the unequal distribution of
that wealth has made it a significantly worse place to live than other countries
with similar levels of overall wealth but a more equal distribution of that wealth.
In effect, living in the U.S. is, by many measures, more like living in Russia185
or Chile186 than it is like living in Norway or Denmark.
While many Americans would likely balk at being compared to Russia
or Chile rather than other advanced democracies, these comparisons should not
be surprising. After all, our level of income inequality is quite similar to that in
Chile,187 and our level of wealth inequality is like that found in Russia.188 Given
our level of inequality, it makes sense that life in the U.S. is similar to life in
those two countries.
V. WHAT TO DO ABOUT INEQUALITY?
One key question that must be answered is whether the government
could or should do something about inequality. After all, the wealthy are not
evil.189 They are simply acting in their own interest by seeking to increase their

178
See
Poverty
Rate,
OECD
DATA,
https://data.oecd.org/inequality/povertyrate.htm#indicator-chart (last visited Aug. 28, 2019).
179
The murder rate in Denmark is 0.7 per 100,000. The murder rate in Norway is 0.6 per
100,000. The rate in the U.S. is 4.9 per 100,000. See Safety, supra note 161.
180
Life Expectancy at Birth, supra note 163.
181
182

See Corak, supra note 70, at 3 fig.1.
Life Satisfaction, supra note 165.

183
According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2018, Denmark is
the least corrupt country in the world. Norway is not far behind. Both are far ahead of the U.S. See
Corruption Perceptions Index 2018, supra note 171.
184
According to Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2018 data, Norway has an aggregate
democracy score of 100, while Norway has a score of 97. The U.S. ranks much farther down the
list with a score of 86. See Freedom in the World 2018, supra note 175.
185
186
187
188

The U.S. has essentially the same infant mortality rate as Russia. See supra note 162.
The U.S. actually has a worse murder rate than Chile. See supra note 161.
See supra Table 1.
See supra note 157.

189
See Winters & Page, supra note 83, at 738 (rejecting the idea that the wealthy form a “cabal”
or “conspiracy”).
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wealth.190 Yet, it is clear that increasing inequality is not harmless.191 There is
now ample evidence that permitting inequality to grow unchecked has very
serious consequences. The results of extremely high inequality include poor
health, a weaker society, slower economic growth, and a weakening of
democracy.192 There is even some evidence that high levels of inequality degrade
the environment.193 Moreover, the consequences of extremely high inequality are
felt throughout society.194 Even the wealthy, who are in many ways insulated
from the worst effects of inequality by their wealth, suffer some of the adverse
effects of that inequality.
But should government take action to limit inequality? The answer is
emphatically yes.195 After all, what is the purpose of our government? The
Constitution explicitly states that a key function of our government is to promote
the general welfare of its citizens.196 Similarly, the Declaration of Independence
argues that the purpose of government is to secure for its citizens “life, liberty
and the pursuit of happiness.”197 Other Founding-era documents advocate similar

190
See id. at 738 (“Though some of [the wealthiest Americans] undoubtedly network with each
other, most are not even mutually acquainted. They are bound together—if at all—by material selfinterest and political clout, not by social ties.”).
191
Arguments to the contrary tend towards the ridiculous. For example, John Tamny’s claim
that surging inequality is “a happy sign” is hard to take seriously. See John Tamny, Surging Wealth
Inequality Is a Happy Sign that Life Is Becoming Much More Convenient, FORBES (Nov. 11, 2018,
9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/johntamny/2018/11/11/surging-wealth-inequality-is-ahappy-sign-that-life-is-becoming-much-more-convenient. His argument simply ignores the
mountain of evidence of the harmful consequences of high levels of inequality. He also presents
straw man arguments. For example, the claim that surging inequality is desirable because two
hundred years ago society was more equal, and people’s lives were worse is deeply flawed. The
comparison that matters is whether people’s lives would be better today with less inequality, not
whether people’s lives are better now than two hundred years ago despite an increase in inequality.
192
See supra Part III.
193
194

See supra Section III.E.
See supra text accompanying note 131.

195
Cf. Bartlett, supra note 7, at 286 (arguing that once we recognize the problem of inequality,
we have a moral obligation to solve it) (“[I]f the problem is that some people have been the
beneficiaries of a system that is rigged in their favor, the only real solution is that the seemingly
beneficent assumptions of the system be exposed and discredited, and the system changed.”).
196
See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (noting that the U.S. government was created, in part, to “promote
the general Welfare”); id., art. I, § 8 (granting to Congress the power to collect taxes in order to
“provide for the . . . general Welfare of the United States”); see also Feldman, supra note 7, at 264
(“Ultimately, the constitutional framers . . . sought to enhance the protection of property rights, but
they simultaneously empowered government to act for the common good.”).
197
See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these truths to be
self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed, by their Creator, with certain
unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure
these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of
the governed . . . .”).
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positions.198 High levels of inequality undermine these goals. They harm the
general welfare in many ways, including by slowing economic growth,
increasing crime, decreasing public health, decreasing trust and social cohesion,
and lowering citizens’ happiness and life satisfaction. Thus, inequality is a proper
subject of government action because regulating inequality is in the public
interest.
It is also important to recognize that our current levels of inequality are
themselves the product of government action.199 High levels of inequality are not
the inexorable consequence of capitalism. The drop in wealth inequality
beginning in the 1930s and lasting through the late 1970s was the result of policy
changes that accompanied the New Deal, particularly high marginal tax rates on
the wealthy and the implementation of an estate tax.200 The return of wealth
inequality since the 1980s was also the result of government policies, particularly
the lowering of income tax rates for the highest earners, reductions in the estate
tax, and financial deregulation.201 Since our current high levels of inequality are
the result of government action, it makes sense that addressing that inequality
will also require government action.
In addition to undermining the general welfare, high levels of inequality
also represent a direct threat to our democracy.202 Governmental power in a
democracy comes from the consent of the governed.203 And the ability of the

198
See Feldman, supra note 7, at 264 n.21 (noting other Founding-era documents that stressed
that government is supposed to work for the common benefit rather than for the interests of
particular groups); see also Andrias, supra note 7, at 433–34, 444 n.124 (arguing that the Federalist
papers show that the Framers were concerned about the possibility of government being used to
favor a particular faction rather than the general good).
199

See, e.g., Kevin G. Bender, Giving the Average Investor the Keys to the Kingdom: How the
Federal Securities Laws Facilitate Wealth Inequality, 15 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 1 (2016) (arguing that
federal securities laws facilitate growing wealth inequality); Cappiello, supra note 7, at 402
(arguing that bankruptcy laws in the U.S. were “designed by the credit industry for the credit
industry” and increase economic inequality); Chung, supra note 7, at 276–77, 293–303 (arguing
that wealth inequality was exacerbated by the Federal Reserve’s decision to engage in quantitative
easing after the Great Recession); Feldman, supra note 7, at 316–19 (arguing that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Citizen’s United greatly increased the influence of wealthy corporate interests
over government policy in ways that increased inequality).
200
See Saez & Zucman, supra note 30, at 554.
201

Id.
See Feldman, supra note 7, at 332 (“Exorbitant material inequality threatens to crack the
pillars of democratic culture.”); Solt, Democratic Political Engagement, supra note 45, at 57
(“That democratic regimes depend for their very existence on a relatively equal distribution of
economic resources across citizens is one of the oldest and best established insights in the study of
politics.”); see also Foa & Mounk, supra note 77, at 15 fig.5 (showing that increases in inequality
are associated with decreases in the electorate’s satisfaction with democracy).
203
See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“That to secure these rights,
governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed . . . .”).
202
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governed to affect government policy through the democratic process is a key
measure of the health of democracies.204 But that linkage no longer works in the
U.S.205 The wealthy have significant influence over the government and use that
influence to protect and increase their wealth, even when that is not what the
majority of Americans want.206 High levels of inequality also undermine popular
support for democracy and increase the risk that a country will become
authoritarian.207 In effect, if our current high levels of inequality persist, we run
a real risk that the U.S. will become authoritarian.208 Thus, our current high level
of inequality both undermines democratic accountability and increases the risk
of authoritarianism. It may also raise Constitutional concerns about the
separation of powers209 and the Due Process clause.210
In the face of this evidence, many political scientists have come to the
conclusion that the influence the wealthy have over government policy,
particularly their ability to prevent the majority from taking actions which are
widely supported, demonstrates that our democracy is not functioning
properly.211 Some have gone further and argued that the U.S. is no longer a
204
See Andrias, supra note 7, at 426 n.26 (“[T]here is general agreement among theorists that
citizens in a democracy ought have equal opportunity to influence the political process, and that
government ought to be responsive to their views.”); Gilens, supra note 82, at 778 (“The ability of
citizens to influence public policy is the ‘bottom line’ of democratic government.”); id. at 779
(“[T]he connection between what citizens want and what government does is a central
consideration in evaluating the quality of democratic governance.”).

See Andrias, supra note 7, at 426 (“In particular, wealth’s dominance undermines the
promise that our system of political checks will produce a government roughly responsive to the
majority will.”).
206
See supra Section III.B.
205

207

Id.
See Foa & Mounk, supra note 77, at 17 (noting that “countries in which more than 20 percent
of respondents express cynicism of democratic governance have, historically, been highly
susceptible to the rise of authoritarian parties, candidates, and political movements”).
208

See Andrias, supra note 7, at 486 (arguing that as a result of “wealth’s disproportionate
influence at every step of the political and governing process . . . the democratic accountability
promised by inter-branch competition, as well as by alternative mechanisms of political
competition, is missing”). The separation of powers between the various branches of our
constitutional system was intended, in part, to ensure democratic accountability and prevent one
group from dominating all the levers of power. See id. at 485–87.
209

210
Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that
“legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring
about repeal of undesirable legislation is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under
the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are more other types of legislation”).
Regrettably, the suggestion in Carolene Products that attempts to undermine democratic
accountability could violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause has never been
developed by the Supreme Court.
211
See Gilens, supra note 82, at 794 (“[A] government that is democratic in form but is in
practice only responsive to its most affluent citizens is a democracy in name only.”); Gilens &
Page, supra note 82, at 576 (“In the United States, . . . the majority does not rule . . . . When a
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democracy at all but is now functionally an oligarchy.212 Now is the time for the
government to strengthen our democracy by reducing inequality. To do nothing
and permit the U.S. to descend into authoritarianism would be unacceptable.213
Unfortunately, change does not seem possible through the normal
lawmaking process. The wealthy have been very successful at preventing the
government from taking actions that would reduce inequality.214 Moreover, even
if a law was passed that reduced inequality, that law would immediately face a
well-funded and well-organized campaign to dilute or eliminate it. For this
reason, this Article advocates a constitutional Amendment. Constitutional
amendments are difficult to pass.215 This is, in fact, one of their defining
features.216 That makes it less likely that any constitutional amendment will be
adopted. But once adopted, it would also be extremely difficult to remove. 217
This means that it would be much harder for the wealthy to undermine the
Amendment.
As President Obama declared in 2013, “[growing inequality] is the
defining challenge of our time.”218 The level of inequality we are now

majority of citizens disagrees with economic elites or with organized interests, they generally
lose.”); see also Andrias, supra note 7, at 471–75 (arguing that the wealthy have been able to
strategically create governmental gridlock in ways that have benefitted their interests).
212
See generally Winters & Page, supra note 83.
213
For example, the Declaration of Independence argues that governments that fail to ensure
the “Safety and Happiness” of their citizens can and should be changed, even abolished, if
necessary. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“That whenever any Form of
Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish
it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its
powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to [a]ffect their Safety and Happiness.”).
214

See supra Section III.B.
See U.S. CONST. art. V (“The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments,
which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when
ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths
thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress.”).
216
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 7.
215

217
The only time a constitutional amendment has been removed is when the 21st Amendment
repealed the 18th Amendment. The 18th Amendment instituted prohibition. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XVIII (“After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or
transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof
from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is
hereby prohibited.”). This was subsequently repealed by the 21st Amendment. See id. amend. XXI
(“The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby
repealed.”).

Full Transcript: President Obama’s December 4 Remarks on the Economy, supra note 2.
See also Pickett & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 316 (noting that various world leaders, including
the U.S. President, the Pope, and the UN Secretary General have all identified inequality as one of
the most important problems of our time).
218
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experiencing represents an existential threat to our society and democracy and
something must be done about it.219 Ultimately, if we are to take seriously
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky’s claim that “constitutional law is about the
meaning of a just society and how best to achieve it,”220 then a constitutional
amendment that addresses inequality is necessary.
VI. THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
If a constitutional amendment is the appropriate method for addressing
inequality, what should that amendment look like? One possibility would be to
simply eliminate inequality, but that is not what this Article proposes. There are
a couple of reasons why eliminating all economic inequality is not desirable. We
have a capitalist economy and that implies a certain level of inequality. Indeed,
some amount of economic inequality is probably beneficial as the possibility of
achieving more wealth than others can be a powerful motivator that can drive
innovations that benefit society as a whole.221 Moreover, while Americans want
a society with dramatically lower inequality than we have now, they do not want
a society with perfect wealth equality.222 In addition, trying to simply eliminate
inequality, particularly abruptly, would probably result in widespread economic
chaos.223 So this Amendment does not try to eliminate all inequality.
Nor does the proposed Amendment require the U.S. to reach a particular
level of inequality. One could imagine an amendment that specified a particular

219
Full Transcript: President Obama’s December 4 Remarks on the Economy, supra note 2
(“The combined trends of increased inequality and decreasing mobility pose a fundamental threat
to the American Dream, our way of life, and what we stand for around the globe.”); id. (“And
finally, rising inequality and declining mobility are bad for our democracy. Ordinary folks can’t
write massive campaign checks or hire high-priced lobbyists and lawyers to secure policies that
tilt the playing field in their favor at everyone else’s expense.”); see also Porter, supra note 4 (“The
bloated incarceration rates and rock-bottom life expectancy, the unraveling families and the
stagnant college graduation rates amount to an existential threat to the nation’s future.”).
220
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1.
221
See Bermeo, supra note 44, at 26 (“The idea that differential rewards provide incentives for
productivity and innovation is intrinsic to capitalism . . . .”); Full Transcript: President Obama’s
December 4 Remarks on the Economy, supra note 2 (“We admire folks who start new businesses,
create jobs and invent the products that enrich our lives. And we expect them to be rewarded
handsomely for it.”).
222
See Norton & Ariely, supra note 141, at 10 (noting that when Americans were asked to
construct a society with an ideal amount of wealth inequality, they picked one that was somewhat
unequal but with dramatically lower levels of wealth inequality than is actually present in the U.S.
today).
223
It took nearly 50 years for inequality to retreat from the highs of the late 1920s to the lows
of the late 1970s. See supra text accompanying notes 199–201. Then, it took another 40 years from
the 1980s until today for inequality to increase to its current high levels. Id. So, it will presumably
take a significant amount of time for inequality levels to retreat. Trying to make these changes
occur very quickly might well result in economic chaos.
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level of wealth inequality and required the government to achieve it.224 There are
several problems with such an amendment. The most important problem is that
we do not know the ideal amount of inequality. We know that lower inequality
is associated with many benefits,225 but inequality also has some benefits.226
Unfortunately, we do not know where to draw the right balance between the
benefits of inequality and its adverse consequences.227 For this reason, the
Amendment does not try to specify a particular goal for wealth inequality.228
Rather, it advocates a less radical and more incremental approach to
addressing inequality. Specifically, it imposes a requirement that the federal
government evaluate the impact on wealth inequality of every new law or rule.
And it prohibits the passage of laws that would increase inequality unless the
government can demonstrate that the law is necessary to achieve an important
governmental purpose. The text of the proposed Amendment follows:
Excessive wealth inequality is harmful. The United States must
assess the impact on wealth inequality of all new legislation and
rulemaking prior to adoption. The nature of the assessment must
be proportional to the expected impact of the legislation or rule.
Such assessments must be public and are subject to judicial
review. The assessment is entitled to judicial deference if it is
both scientific and reasonable. A law or rule may not increase
wealth inequality unless that law or rule is narrowly tailored to
achieve an important governmental purpose, and the expected
benefit of achieving that purpose exceeds the cost of increasing
wealth inequality. Individuals or organizations have standing to
challenge that law or rule if they will fairly and adequately

224
The simplest way to implement this might be to require that there be an annual wealth tax
and that the amount of the wealth tax would increase incrementally until the desired Gini
coefficient of wealth inequality was achieved. The wealth tax could then be decreased to whatever
is the minimum level necessary to maintain wealth inequality at or below the target level.
225
See supra Part III.
226

See supra text accompanying note 221.
See Bartlett, supra note 7, at 282 (noting that “current levels of economic inequality are
unacceptable, but there remains the question of how much inequality is too much”). Indeed, there
may not be one ideal level of inequality for all societies. The “correct” level of inequality probably
depends on how many of the costs of inequality a society wishes to endure to achieve the benefits.
And the correct balance may be different for different societies. Thus, the ideal level of inequality
for the U.S. might end up being different from the ideal level for other countries. Of course, one
could ask Americans what their preferred level of inequality would be. Cf. Norton & Ariely, supra
note 141 (surveying Americans about their preferred inequality levels). But there is no guarantee
that individuals’ preferences would correspond to the theoretically “ideal” level of inequality.
227

228

If, as our understanding of the effects of inequality increase, we are eventually able to
identify what the “ideal” level of inequality is, then it may make sense to specify that as a concrete
goal. It is not clear, however, whether that will ever be possible. See supra note 227 (suggesting
that there may not be a single ideal level of inequality that all societies should pursue).
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represent the public interest in opposing excessive wealth
inequality.
One potential criticism of this approach is that it does not require any
reduction in wealth inequality. It simply prevents the government from
increasing inequality further. In theory, it could simply lock in the status quo.
Yet, the status quo is enormously harmful.229 Thus, the argument would go, we
should do more than simply prevent additional inequality and take concrete steps
to reduce existing levels of inequality.
It is true that, in theory, the amendment could simply lock in the existing
high level of inequality because it does not explicitly mandate reductions in that
inequality. In practice, that outcome is extremely unlikely because it would
require Congress to never pass another law that reduced inequality. Rather than
viewing the amendment as locking in the status quo, it is better to think of the
amendment as a one-way ratchet.230 Congress will very rarely be able to pass a
law that increases inequality.231 It will, however, be able to freely pass laws that
decrease inequality.
While not all laws have an effect on inequality, Congress does pass laws
that reduce inequality, sometimes dramatically. For example, in 1935, the
passage of the Social Security Act “created a social insurance program designed
to pay retired workers age 65 or older a continuing income after retirement.”232
The passage of the Social Security Act Amendments of 1965 had the effect of
creating Medicare, a “basic program of hospital insurance for persons age 65 and
older, and a supplementary medical insurance program to aid the elderly in
paying doctor bills and other health care bills.” 233 More recently, the passage of
the Affordable Care Act led to “historic gains in health insurance coverage by
extending Medicaid coverage to many low-income individuals” who had not
previously been able to afford health insurance.234 Thus, after the amendment is
adopted, more and more laws will be passed that reduce inequality, often by
small amounts, occasionally by large amounts, but very few or no laws will be
passed that increase inequality. In effect, the amendment makes it very likely that

229

See supra Part IV (describing the adverse effects of inequality in the United States today).

230

Cf. Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Ratchet Effect, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1702, 1704–
05 (2017) (describing how there may be a “ratchet effect” whereby over time more and more of
our law is transformed into constitutional law).
231
The Amendment does contemplate some circumstances under which it might be possible to
increase wealth inequality, but those will probably be extremely rare. See infra Section VI.F.
(describing the heightened scrutiny that will be applied to laws or rules that increase inequality).
232
Historical Background and Development of Social Security, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN.,
https://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2019).
233
Social
Security
Act
Amendments
(1965),
OUR
DOCUMENTS,
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=99 (last visited Aug. 29, 2019).
234
Key Facts about the Uninsured Population, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Dec. 7,
2018), https://www.kff.org/uninsured/fact-sheet/key-facts-about-the-uninsured-population/.
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inequality will be reduced incrementally over time. This gradual reduction in
inequality over time is, in fact, the desired outcome.235
The components of the proposed amendment and what they mean are
discussed in the sections below. Each section addresses one of the sentences in
the amendment.
A. “Excessive wealth inequality is harmful.”
The first sentence states the conclusion that justifies amending the
Constitution. In some ways, it may appear unnecessary or contradictory to the
general practice with regards to constitutional amendments to include this
sentence. After all, the Thirteenth Amendment does not explicitly state that
slavery is bad. It simply bans slavery.236 Nevertheless, it seems desirable to
explicitly state that excessive wealth inequality is harmful for several reasons.
First, it is important to embed this concept as firmly as possible in the
Constitution. One thing that has been noticeable is that as inequality grows, those
with wealth become more successful at capturing the organs of the government
and using them to protect and expand their wealth.237 Those with the most wealth
are likely to see this Amendment as an impediment to their goals and attack it.
And they will have the wealth and incentive to make a concerted and
well-financed effort to undermine it over a long period of time. By embedding
the idea that excessive wealth inequality is harmful directly in the Constitution,
this Amendment establishes it as a fundamental tenet of our constitutional system
on a par with the importance of due process or the prohibition of slavery. This

235

See supra note 223 (noting that it took 40 years for inequality levels to rise to their current
levels and that trying to reverse that process very quickly would probably result in serious
economic disruption).
236
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”). On the other hand, it is not unusual for
statutes to contain statements of their purpose. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 (West 2019) (“The
purposes of this chapter are: To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and
enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or
eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man;
to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation;
and to establish a Council on Environmental Quality.”).
237
See The Editorial Board, The Tax Bill that Inequality Created, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/16/opinion/sunday/tax-bill-inequality-created.html (“As a
smaller and smaller group of people cornered an ever-larger share of the nation’s wealth, so too
did they gain an ever-larger share of political power. They became, in effect, kingmakers; the
[2017] tax bill is a natural consequence of their long effort to bend American politics to serve their
interests.”); see also supra Section III.B; cf. Solt, Testing the Schattschneider Hypothesis, supra
note 46, at 286–87 (noting that “[h]igher levels of economic inequality allow richer citizens to
more successfully dominate the setting of the political agenda, pushing beyond debate those issues
addressing the needs of poorer citizens”).
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makes it much harder for those who will seek to undermine this Amendment to
blunt its impact.
When courts eventually adjudicate disputes about the constitutionality
of particular laws or rules, they will have to do so in light of the clear statement
in the Constitution that excessive wealth inequality is harmful. Whatever
interpretation is given to the Amendment by future courts, it must begin with and
accept that excessive wealth inequality is harmful.238 This will limit attempts to
blunt the impact of the Amendment by creative legal arguments that question or
downplay the harm caused by excessive inequality.
Second, the introductory sentence is important because it makes it clear
that it is excessive wealth inequality that is harmful, not wealth inequality itself.
Ours is a capitalist society, and some level of inequality is unavoidable and
probably even desirable.239 So this Amendment does not try to eliminate all
inequality. But the evidence is overwhelming that excessive wealth inequality is
harmful.240 In this sense, the word “excessive” may well be the most important
word in the entire Amendment.241
Finally, this sentence makes it clear that the Amendment focuses
specifically on wealth inequality, rather than income inequality or economic
inequality. Wealth inequality was chosen over income inequality for a number
of reasons.242 Arguably, the most important reason is that wealth inequality is
greater than income inequality.243 As a result, a focus on wealth inequality better
captures the true level of inequality in the U.S.244
Wealth inequality was also chosen over economic inequality, although
for different reasons. At first glance, economic inequality appears to be a better
focus for the Amendment. Economic inequality is a broader term that includes
wealth inequality but also access to other economic opportunities.245 Thus, in
theory, economic inequality captures the true state of inequality in American
better than wealth inequality.246 But economic inequality is a much broader and
more ambiguous concept. This is problematic because the Amendment depends
on the ability of the government and litigants to measure both the current state

This may help alleviate Professor Andrias’s concern that judges are not the best group to
scrutinize the effects of inequality because they are generally elites who may be predisposed to
favor the interests of the wealthy. See Andrias, supra note 7, at 492.
239
See supra text accompanying notes 221–222.
238

240

See supra Part III.
The Amendment deliberately does not take a position on what level of wealth inequality is
appropriate or desirable. See supra text accompanying notes 224–228.
242
See supra text accompanying notes 36–40.
241

243
244
245
246

See supra text accompanying notes 36–40.
See supra text accompanying notes 36–40.
See supra text accompanying notes 42–44.
See supra text accompanying notes 42–44.
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of inequality and the effect of legislation on it. This would be very hard to do
with economic inequality,247 but would be much easier with wealth inequality.
First, most of the information necessary to measure wealth inequality either
already exists or would not be hard to obtain.248 Second, while it would be very
difficult to predict the impact of legislation and rulemaking on all forms of
economic inequality, it is feasible to estimate the impact on wealth inequality.249
Thus, wealth inequality does a pretty good job of capturing what makes America
unequal, without causing the measurement and prediction problems that would
stem from using economic inequality in the Amendment.
B. “The United States must assess the impact of all new legislation and
rulemaking on wealth inequality prior to adoption.”
This sentence addresses a number of issues. First, it defines which parts
of our government are bound by the Amendment. The Amendment applies to the
“United States,” i.e., the federal government. It does not affect private action, it
does not bind local governments and it does not bind the states. It only affects
the federal government. This is roughly equivalent to the existing “state action”
doctrine in constitutional law.250 Of course, the federal government is the largest
government in the country, so the effect will be far from negligible.
One might question why the Amendment does not apply to state and
local governments. After all, if preventing the federal government from
increasing inequality is desirable, wouldn’t it also be desirable to do the same
with state and local governments? The main reason to limit the Amendment to
the federal government is because the federal government is the principal cause
of the surge in inequality that has occurred since the 1980s. That surge was driven
largely by decreases in the income tax, reductions in the estate tax, and the
deregulation of industry.251 Those changes were all implemented at the federal
level. Thus, while it is almost certainly true that state and local governments have
some impact on inequality, the principal driver of inequality is the federal
government. For that reason, this Amendment applies only to the federal
government.252
Second, it makes clear that the Amendment applies to only new
legislation and rulemaking. It does not impose a requirement that the federal

247

See supra text accompanying notes 42–44.

248

See infra text accompanying notes 257–261 (noting that the government already collects
most of the information it needs to estimate the amount of wealth inequality in the United States).
249
See infra text accompanying notes 262–265 (noting that some private groups already
estimate the effect of major legislation on inequality).
250
251

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 507–09.
See supra text accompanying notes 199–201.

252
Of course, nothing prevents states from implementing similar provisions in their own state
constitutions.
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government review all existing laws and rules for their effect on inequality. This
was done for pragmatic reasons. A strong moral argument could be made that we
should consider the consequences of the laws that formed the society we
currently have. They clearly permit significant and damaging inequality.253 But
requiring us to quickly and completely re-imagine society (which a retrospective
test for all existing law would necessitate), would require dramatic and
wrenching changes. This Amendment makes a choice to accept all of the
decisions that have already been made and focus on improving the future. Thus,
the changes that will occur will be incremental and less disruptive to society and
the economy.254
Third, the Amendment applies to laws passed by Congress and to
rulemaking by federal agencies. While it has a broad reach, it does not cover all
government action. For example, it does not cover much of the day to day
operations of the federal government. Individual decisions taken pursuant to laws
and rules are not subject to scrutiny. It is assumed that if the laws and rules
comply with the Amendment, then the day to day application of those laws will
also comply.255
While it might be possible to impose an obligation to assess the impact
of every government action on wealth inequality, that does not seem prudent.
After all, the government must still be able to function after the Amendment is
added to the Constitution. If the government were required to evaluate the effect
on inequality of every single act, it would make it hard for the government to get
anything done. Most governmental acts, however, are presumably taken pursuant
to either laws or rules. Thus, requiring the government to assess the effect of new
laws and rules in advance should help ensure that the acts taken to effectuate
those laws do not undermine the purpose of the Amendment.
Fourth, and most importantly, the Amendment requires the federal
government to assess the impact on wealth inequality of all new laws and rules.
This assessment must be undertaken prior to the law or rule being adopted. This

253
254

See supra Part IV.

It has taken nearly 40 years for wealth inequality to reach its current levels from the lows of
the late 1970s and early 1980s. See supra Part IV. It is unlikely that this process can be reversed
very quickly. For this reason, an incremental approach is probably best.
255
This will not always true. There are lots of examples of governments applying facially
neutral laws and rules in ways which have turned out to be discriminatory or harmful. See, e.g.,
Rebecca Onion, Take the Impossible “Literacy” Test Louisiana Gave Black Voters in the 1960s,
SLATE (June 28, 2013), https://slate.com/human-interest/2013/06/voting-rights-and-the-supremecourt-the-impossible-literacy-test-louisiana-used-to-give-black-voters.html (describing how
facially neutral literacy tests were used to disenfranchise African-Americans during the 1960s).
Nevertheless, it does seem reasonable to assume that most of the time, if a good faith effort is made
to apply rules or laws that comply with this Amendment, then the effects on inequality will not be
too great.
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means that every rule or law, before it can be adopted, will have to be
accompanied by a public256 assessment of the effect of the rule on inequality.
For this assessment to be possible it first requires a way to measure
wealth inequality. Fortunately, the calculation of wealth inequality is possible,257
although not necessarily easy.258 Still, if two researchers can do it on their own,259
then the government (with all of the resources it could bring to bear) can certainly
do it too.260 In many cases, the data needed to calculate wealth inequality are
already collected by financial institutions for use in managing their clients’
accounts, and the additional cost of requiring those to be reported to the
government would be relatively low.261
Next, it requires the ability to predict the effect of legislation and
rulemaking on wealth inequality. While the government does not currently do
that, there does not seem to be any reason why it could not. After all, the
government already assesses the economic impact of major legislation. For
example, the Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) conducted an in-depth
assessment of the economic impact of the 2017 Tax Act.262 However, despite
predicting the impact of the 2017 Tax Act on GDP, corporate income tax rates,
and investment,263 it never mentions its effect on inequality.264 But, a number of
private groups already use sophisticated models to predict the economic effect
of major legislation, including the impact on inequality. 265 In other words, the

256

See infra Section VI.D (discussing the requirement that the assessments be public).
See Saez & Zucman, supra note 30, at 520 (describing a way to calculate wealth inequality
from data collected for the payment of income taxes).
258
Id. at 527–40 (describing the complex process by which Saez and Zucman calculated wealth
inequality in the United States).
259
See generally id.
257

260
Saez and Zucman note that the U.S. government could produce much better estimates of
wealth inequality than they were able to simply by using data that the IRS already has and
combining those with data that the Treasury Department could collect “at low cost.” Id. at 525; see
also id. at 574 (“The ideal source for studying wealth inequality would be high-quality annual
wealth data collected by governments . . . .”).
261
Id. at 574–75.
262

See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2018 TO 2028, at 105
app.B (2018), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-04/53651-outlook-2.pdf.
263

Id. at 106.
This was confirmed by text searching the CBO report for the terms “economic inequality,”
“wealth inequality,” and “inequality.” None of those terms was found anywhere in the report.
265
For example, the Penn Wharton Budget Model can be used to predict the “distribution of
income over time” of new policies. Our Model, PENN WHARTON BUDGET MODEL,
http://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/our-model-0 (last visited Sept. 20, 2019). The Tax Policy
Center has a “Microsimulation Model” that it has used to produce estimates of the effects of major
legislation, like the 2017 Tax Act. Donald Trump’s Revised Tax Plan, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Oct. 11,
2016),
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/model-estimates/donald-trumps-revised-tax-plan-oct2016/t16-0211-donald-trumps-revised-tax-plan.
264
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government could have estimated the effect of the 2017 Tax Act on inequality if
it had wanted to.266
Perhaps more importantly, requiring the government to estimate the
effect of legislation and rulemaking on inequality will force the government to
think carefully about the impact of its actions. For example, the 2017 Tax Act
“lowers . . . the tax rate paid by businesses subject to corporate income tax,”267
reduces the marginal tax rate paid by the highest earners,268 and reduces the
taxation of wealth transferred at death.269 These changes seem likely to increase
economic inequality by reducing the taxes (and therefore increasing the income)
of the wealthiest people.270 The 2017 Tax Act might have been harder to pass if
the government had been forced to publicly acknowledge this prior to it
becoming law.
Indeed, there is some reason to believe that making the effects of
legislation on wealth inequality public might itself reduce inequality over time.
One group of scholars has argued that the lack of demand for redistributive
policies is partly due to a lack of information about how unequal societies have
become.271 This suggests that if the true state of inequality or the effect of
legislation on inequality were better known, this would increase demands for
more fair policies.272 Ultimately, increasing public awareness about inequality
could itself contribute to decreasing it.

266
Indeed, the Tax Policy Center did estimate the distributional effect of the Tax Cuts and Jobs
Act in real time. Analysis of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, TAX POL’Y CTR.,
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/feature/analysis-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act (last updated May 3,
2019). If a think tank can do it, the U.S. government can do it too.
267
268

See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 262, at 107.
Id. at 112.

269

Id. at 113 (discussing the effect of changes to the estate and gift taxes).
Analysis of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, supra note 266, at fig.1 (finding that the Act would
provide the greatest benefit to Americans in the top 5% of the income distribution); Dylan Scott &
Alvin Chang, The Republican Tax Bill Will Exacerbate Income Inequality in America, VOX (Dec.
4,
2017),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/12/2/16720952/senate-tax-billinequality (noting that the reduction in the corporate tax rate “is expected to disproportionately
benefit the wealthy” and that “rolling back the estate tax” is an “unambiguous giveaway[] to the
richest Americans”); The Editorial Board, supra note 237.
270

271

See generally Vladimir Gimpelson & Daniel Treisman, Misperceiving Inequality, 30 ECON.
& POL. 27 (2018).
Id.; see also Leslie McCall et al., Exposure to Rising Inequality Shapes Americans’
Opportunity Beliefs and Policy Support, 114 PNAS 9593 (2017) (finding that people exposed to
information about the true level of inequality in the United States became more willing to support
policies aimed at reducing inequality).
272
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C. “The nature of the assessment must be proportional to the expected
impact of the legislation or rule.”
This sentence recognizes that evaluating the impact of laws and rules
will not be a one-size-fits-all undertaking. Rather, the nature of the assessment is
a function of the expected impact of the rule or law being considered. If a rule is
expected to have a relatively small impact on inequality, then it makes sense that
the government’s assessment of its impact could be simpler than it would be if
the rule were expected to have a large impact.
So, for example, the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) has
promulgated rules that govern the maximum levels of natural or unavoidable
defects that present no health hazard that are permitted in foods for human use.273
It seems unlikely that there is great potential for affecting wealth inequality in
rules that govern the maximum permitted amount of insect parts in ground
allspice.274 Such a rule would probably be accompanied by a very simple
assessment.
On the other hand, a law that has a larger expected impact would require
a more sophisticated analysis. For example, a law like the 2017 Tax Act that
significantly changes the tax code could be expected to have a significant impact
on wealth inequality and would require a sophisticated assessment of its effect.275
Of course, the federal government already creates sophisticated assessments of
the economic impact of major legislation like the 2017 Tax Act.276 So, extending
that analysis to estimate the effect on wealth inequality would not impose an
insurmountable new burden on the federal government.277
D. “Such assessments must be public and are subject to judicial review.”
It is important that the government’s assessments (and the reasoning and
data that supports those assessments) be public.278 This will permit citizens to
evaluate the actions of their government. After all, if the government consistently

273

Natural or Unavoidable Defects in Food for Human Use that Present No Health Hazard, 21
C.F.R. § 110.110 (2019).
274

See Food Defect Levels Handbook, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 7, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/food/guidanceregulation/guidancedocumentsregulatoryinformation/sanitatio
ntransportation/ucm056174.htm.
275
See supra text accompanying notes 262–270 (assessing the economic effects of the 2017
Tax Act).
276
See supra text accompanying notes 262–264 (describing the government’s analysis of the
2017 Tax Act).
277
See supra text accompanying note 265 (arguing that predicting the effect of legislation on
wealth inequality is not an insurmountable problem).
278
Cf. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914)
(noting that “[s]unlight is said to be the best of disinfectants” and arguing that more public
disclosure would help people better restrain the damaging effects of wealth concentration).
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passes laws that its own assessments predict will increase inequality, it is
important that citizens know this so that they can decide whether their
representatives are really representing their interests.279 Making the
government’s assessment public (including the reasoning and data that support
the assessment) will also make it easier for people to decide whether to challenge
the government’s assessment. If the assessment contains questionable
assumptions or data, that will make it more likely that the assessment will be
challenged.
Public disclosure may also help keep the government honest as it will
have to show how it arrived at its assessment. There will be incentives for
governments to produce assessments that minimize the impact of policies the
government wishes to engage in. For example, the Council of Economic
Advisors’ estimate of the effect of the 2017 Tax Act, which predicted that
reducing corporate tax rates would dramatically increase economic growth and
offset the loss of revenue caused by the tax cut, was viewed as deeply flawed and
self-serving by many experts.280 In another example, the Trump Administration
is changing the way it calculates the effect of climate change to simply eliminate
consideration of harms that occur after 2040 as a means to justify rolling back
environmental regulations designed to mitigate those future harms.281 This has
been described by scientists as “a pretty blatant attempt to politicize the
science—to push the science in a direction that’s consistent with their
politics.”282 Making the reasoning and assumptions of all assessments public will
make it harder (although not impossible) for governments to “massage” the
numbers to achieve a preferred outcome.

279

Since increasing economic inequality places a greater and greater share of the resources into
fewer and fewer hands, most people do not want a society characterized by excessive wealth
inequality and they do not want their representatives in the federal government to deliberately
increase wealth inequality unless there are powerful reasons to justify it. See supra Section III.B
(describing the attitudes of the middle class and the poor towards wealth inequality); see also
Norton & Ariely, supra note 141, at 10 (noting that when Americans were asked to construct a
society with an ideal amount of wealth inequality, they picked one that was somewhat unequal but
with dramatically lower levels of wealth inequality than is actually present in the U.S. today).
Indeed, there is some evidence that making more information about the effects of legislation on
inequality might increase demands for redistributive policies. See Gimpelson & Treisman, supra
note 271.
280
See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Opinion, Everybody Hates the Trump Tax Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/16/opinion/trump-tax-plan-hate.html.
281
See Coral Davenport & Mark Landler, Trump Administration Hardens Its Attack on Climate
Science, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/27/us/politics/trumpclimate-science.html.
282
Id. (quoting Philip P. Duffy, president of the Woods Hold Research Center and one of the
scientists that reviewed the government’s last National Climate Assessment).
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This portion of the proposed amendment also makes it clear that the
government’s assessments can be challenged in court.283 The government’s
assessments are not sacrosanct. The courts will have an important role to play in
ensuring that the government complies with the Amendment. This oversight by
the courts will limit the government’s ability to adopt flawed or self-serving
assessments that are designed to minimize or hide expected increases in wealth
inequality caused by proposed legislation or rulemaking.284 The federal
government must make a reasonable and scientific assessment,285 and, if it does
not, it risks having that assessment overturned by the courts and the resulting
legislation held to be unconstitutional.
The availability of judicial review implicitly raises the question of
severability. If the law is a single integrated whole that unconstitutionally
increases inequality, then the entire act must be struck down.286 For example, a
law that contained a single provision that eliminated the estate tax would almost
certainly violate this amendment because it would increase inequality but not
serve any important governmental purpose.287 Moreover, it would be difficult to
imagine how such a law could be saved by severing part of it.288 Removing the
unconstitutional part (the elimination of the estate tax) would leave nothing
behind. In effect, the entire law would have to be struck down.
But, what if we consider a law that includes provisions that both increase
and decrease inequality? The recent 2017 Tax Act is an example of this, as it
contained some tax reductions for the poor and middle class that (on their own)
would have slightly reduced inequality,289 but it also contained provisions that
increased inequality by reducing taxes for the wealthy.290 Could the courts strike
down just those portions that increase inequality thus bringing the act into

283
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (establishing that U.S. courts can review laws
and find them unconstitutional).
284
See supra notes 280–282 (describing some recent attempts by the federal government to
produce flawed assessments designed to justify a particular policy).
285
See infra Section VI.E.
286

See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987) (noting that a statute that is not
“fully operative as a law” after the unconstitutional part is removed must be struck down in its
entirety).
287
It is hard to imagine what important governmental purpose would be served by permitting
the extremely wealthy to transmit all of their wealth to their offspring.
288
Cf. Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684 (stating that the Court’s goal is to “refrain from
invalidating more of the statute than is necessary” (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652
(1984))).
The Tax Policy Center’s analysis indicated that the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act would
slightly increase the after-tax income of people in the bottom three quintiles, although the average
gain would be less than 1%, even as the Act provided the largest benefits for individuals in the top
5% of the income distribution. See Analysis of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, supra note 266.
289

290
See supra text accompanying notes 262–270 (describing the 2017 Tax Act and its effect on
wealth inequality).

2019]

WEALTH INEQUALITY AMENDMENT

41

compliance with the amendment? Or, is it necessary to strike down the entire act
and require Congress to start over?
This is a difficult issue.291 While there is a general rule in favor of saving
as much of the statute or rule as possible,292 there are practical difficulties in
implementing this rule. After all, if the judiciary decides which parts of the law
to keep and which parts to invalidate, the court might end up effectively rewriting
the law in ways that are not consistent with Congress’s original intent.293 Thus,
the general practice is for the court to sever portions of a law only if Congress
would have enacted the law even if it did not contain the unconstitutional
provision.294
This imposes a difficult counterfactual on the court and it may not be
easy to determine whether Congress (or an agency) would have passed the law
or rule if it did not have the contested provision.295 These difficult questions
could be made easier if Congress and the various federal agencies routinely
included severability clauses in laws and rules.296 Severability clauses could give
the courts guidance about which parts could be severed. But, ultimately, the
courts will have to decide whether it makes sense to sever the parts of the statute
that make it unconstitutional or whether to strike down the entire thing. 297 It is
assumed that they will use the existing “well established” severability rules when
making those decisions.298

291
See Abbe R. Gluck & Michael J. Graetz, Opinion, The Severability Doctrine, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 22, 2012 (discussing the difficult choices presented by severing the unconstitutional parts of
a statute).
292

See Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684.
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 692 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The
Judiciary, if it orders uncritical severance, then assumes the legislative function; for it imposes on
the Nation, by the Court’s own decree, its own statutory regime . . . .”).
293

294

See Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684.
See Charles W. Tyler & E. Donald Elliott, Administrative Severability Clauses, 124 YALE
L.J. 2286, 2295 (2015).
296
See id. at 2313–17 (describing the rise of severability clauses in statutes and agency rules).
295

297

See Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684. An alternative approach, although not one necessarily
endorsed by this Article, would be to have the courts sever the unconstitutional parts of the statute
and simultaneously temporarily enjoin that decision. This would give Congress time to rewrite the
statute to save the parts that are important while also complying with the Constitution. See
generally Robert L. Nightingale, How to Trim a Christmas Tree: Beyond Severability and
Inseverability for Omnibus Statutes, 125 YALE L.J. 1672 (2016).
298
See Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684 (describing the severability rules discussed in Alaska
Airlines as “well established”).
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E. “The assessment is entitled to judicial deference if it is both scientific
and reasonable.”
While it is important that the government’s assessments be subject to
judicial review, that does not mean that the courts should review all of the
government’s decision-making de novo.299 Rather, the government will often be
entitled to judicial deference with regards to its assessments. That judicial
deference is not automatic, however. The courts should not give deference in
situations where the government is not acting in good faith to assess the impact
on inequality.300 Rather than have the courts assess the government’s good faith
directly, however, the Amendment creates a safe harbor provision.
So long as the assessment is both scientific301 and reasonable,302 the
assessment will be entitled to judicial deference. To be scientific, an assessment
would have to be “grounded in the methods and procedures of science.”303 It
must be more than simply “subjective belief or unsupported speculation.”304
Rather, it must be “derived from the scientific method.”305 To be reasonable, an
assessment must be a “reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing
interests.”306 In effect, the government must be making an honest and
evidence-based effort to understand a complex problem. It cannot simply be
producing a biased assessment to support a predetermined outcome.307 When the
government undertakes a reasonable and scientific assessment, then courts
should defer to that assessment. If the government’s assessment does not meet
these criteria, then the court is free to ignore it when determining whether the
law or rule complies with this Amendment.
Of course, deference to the government’s determinations is not intended
to be unlimited. Even if the government’s assessment is entitled to deference, the

299
De novo review means the court would consider the effect of the legislation or rulemaking
on inequality anew, as if no governmental assessment had been done. Cf. Freeman v. DirecTV,
Inc., 457 F.3d 1001, 1004 (9th Cir. 2006).
300

See supra notes 280–282 (describing some recent attempts by the federal government to
produce flawed assessments designed to justify a particular policy).
301

Cf. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (discussing the requirement
that expert testimony be scientific in nature to be admissible).
302

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that the
courts must defer to an agency’s administrative actions if they are reasonable).
303
304
305
306

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
Id.
Id.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961)).

307
See supra notes 280–282 (describing some recent attempts by the federal government to
produce flawed assessments designed to justify a particular policy).
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courts may still ignore it if it is clearly erroneous.308 An assessment will be clearly
erroneous, and thus not subject to deference, if the court is “left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”309
F. “A law or rule may not increase wealth inequality unless that law or rule
is narrowly tailored to achieve an important governmental purpose, and
the expected benefit of achieving that purpose exceeds the cost of
increasing wealth inequality.”
This represents the heart of the Amendment. First, if a law or rule does
not result in a net increase in wealth inequality, then the law or rule may be
adopted. There is no requirement that laws must reduce inequality.310
However, if a law or rule would result in a net increase in wealth
inequality, then there are additional requirements that must be met before it can
be adopted. The Amendment does not prohibit all laws or rules that increase
inequality. Rather, it subjects them to heightened scrutiny. First, the rule must be
narrowly tailored to achieve an important governmental purpose. This language
is similar in nature to the existing “intermediate scrutiny” standard in
constitutional law.311 It requires that the purpose of the law must be an
“important” one rather than simply a legitimate goal of government.312 In
addition, the law must be substantially related to achieving that important
governmental purpose, rather than simply a reasonable way of doing so.313 As a
result, the way in which the law or rule operates must be narrowly tailored to
achieve an important governmental goal.314
In addition to satisfying the intermediate scrutiny standard, the expected
benefit of the law must exceed the cost of the net increase in wealth inequality.

308

Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (noting that judicial determinations of fact should not be set
aside on appeal unless they are “clearly erroneous”).
309

Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 235 (2001) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co.,
333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
Having said that, there is an expectation that severely limiting the government’s ability to
pass laws that increase inequality will result in inequality gradually decreasing. See supra text
accompanying notes 229–235.
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CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 540.
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Id.; see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“To withstand constitutional
challenge, previous cases established that classifications by gender must serve important
governmental objectives . . . .”).
313
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 540; see also Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (“To withstand
constitutional challenge, previous cases established that classifications by gender . . . must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”).
312

314

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 541; see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525,
556 (2001) (refusing to apply the “least restrictive means” test to restrictions on commercial speech
but holding that they must be “narrowly tailored” to achieve the desired outcome (citations
omitted)).
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Implicitly, this means that if the government’s assessment finds that the law or
rule will increase inequality and the government wishes to pass the law anyway,
it must also quantify the expected benefit of the law and show that the expected
benefit exceeds the cost of the net increase in wealth inequality. The achievement
of the expected benefit identified in the assessment must also be an important
governmental purpose.
The effect of this is to limit the government’s ability to pass laws or rules
that increase wealth inequality without a very good reason. It is not a blanket ban
on laws or rules that increase economic inequality. There may be some important
governmental purpose that can only be achieved by increasing inequality. If that
is the case, then this Amendment does permit laws that will increase inequality.
But it has the effect of requiring the government to assess the impact on wealth
inequality before passing new laws or rules and it forces the government to
justify any laws or rules that will increase inequality. Given this restriction, it is
expected that the government will only rarely be able to justify increasing
inequality.
Professor Andrias has previously considered whether heightened
judicial scrutiny of legislation that benefits the wealthy is a good idea.315 She
ultimately concluded that heightened judicial review would not be the best
course.316 The Amendment proposed in this Article, however, avoids many of
her criticisms. Her first criticism is that courts are not well placed to evaluate the
impact of legislation on inequality.317 This concern is mitigated by the fact that
the court will not be conducting its own assessment of the effect of the challenged
legislation or rule, rather it will be evaluating the government’s assessment of
that effect. This transfers the initial burden of assessing the impact of legislation
to the government, which has the expertise and resources to undertake it.
Moreover, the plaintiffs in these actions are likely to have the expertise and
resources to produce their own models of the effect of legislation on
inequality.318 Thus, courts will not have to produce their own estimates of the
effects of legislation, but rather evaluate the models produced by the parties.
Trial judges are not scientists, but they do engage in something similar to this

315
See Andrias, supra note 7, at 488–89 (suggesting that one possible response to the influence
of the wealthy is for courts to impose “greater scrutiny” when “governmental action serves to
further concentrate power among the wealthy”).

See id. at 491–92 (arguing that “there are reasons to be wary of relying on the judiciary to
reduce” the influence of the wealthy on government).
316

317

Id. at 491.
See supra text accompanying notes 265–266 (noting that several organizations already
operate sophisticated economic models that can produce real time predictions of the effects of
major legislation); see also infra Section VI.G (requiring that plaintiffs be able to adequately
represent the public interest, including having the requisite experience and resources to litigate the
matter).
318
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quite regularly—evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony.319 Thus, it
seems reasonable to assume they can undertake the evaluation required by this
Amendment.320
Next, Professor Andrias argues that individuals and organizations with
concerns about the future implications of legislation will not be able to
participate because they won’t have standing.321 That is a valid concern under
the current standing doctrine, which the proposed Amendment resolves by
creating a special standing provision for suits brought under this Amendment.322
This will permit individuals and organizations to sue if they can demonstrate that
they will adequately represent the public interest in opposing excessive wealth
inequality.323
She also raises concerns about whether those who are not wealthy will
be able to compete with wealthy interest groups who can engage in repeated and
well-financed litigation.324 This is obviously a concern,325 but not one that should
prevent the adoption of the Amendment. The wealthy will always be at an
advantage in influencing all of the branches of government by virtue of their
greater resources.326 If we were to accept that argument as a reason not to try to
address inequality, then we would never be able to do anything about it. The
better question is not whether the wealthy influence the courts but rather whether
the wealthy are significantly better at influencing the courts than they are at
influencing the other branches. In the absence of such evidence,327 it seems
appropriate to assign the task of ensuring the constitutionality of the laws to the
judiciary. That is, after all, one of their traditional functions.328

319

See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (observing that a trial
judge faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony must make an initial determination of
whether that testimony is both scientific in nature and will assist the trier of fact (citing FED. R.
EVID. 702)).
320
The Supreme Court said of the evaluation of expert testimony that “[w]e are confident that
federal judges possess the capacity to undertake this review.” Id. at 593.
321
See Andrias, supra note 7, at 491.
322
323

See infra Section VI.G.
Id.

324

See Andrias, supra note 7, at 492.
See supra text accompanying note 237 (arguing that one reason to frame this as an
Amendment to the Constitution rather than a statute is to try to insulate if from the efforts of
wealthy interest groups to undermine it).
325

326

See supra Section III.B.
Professor Andrias’s own work suggests that the wealthy are in fact quite adept at influencing
all of the branches of the government, especially Congress and the President. See Andrias, supra
note 7, at 444–52.
327

328
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (establishing that U.S. courts can review laws
and find them unconstitutional).
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Finally, Professor Andrias expresses concern that judges may not be
well-placed to adjudicate disputes about economic inequality because they are
themselves largely elites.329 This is true,330 but so too are most members of
Congress and the President.331 So, it is not clear that trusting this task to the
judiciary necessarily involves worse concerns than would trusting it to other
branches. Moreover, as Professor Andrias acknowledges, Article III judges are
not subject to capture in quite the same way as the other branches.332 Ultimately,
the Amendment tries to blunt this impact by expressly embedding in the
Constitution the idea that excessive wealth inequality is harmful.333 For these
reasons, the Amendment includes heightened scrutiny of statutes and rules that
impact wealth inequality despite Professor Andrias’s misgivings.
G. “Individuals or organizations have standing to challenge that law or
rule if they will fairly and adequately represent the public interest in
opposing excessive wealth inequality.”
The constitutionality of new laws or rules can be challenged under this
amendment. This is evident from the provision on judicial review.334 But in
recent decades, the federal courts have erected a number of potential barriers to
the enforcement of this Amendment. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction would
not be a problem as federal courts would have jurisdiction over claims made
under this Amendment.335 But there are other potential problems. For example,
the Supreme Court has been hostile to private actions to enforce federal law.336
The Amendment makes it clear that both individuals and organizations have a
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See Andrias, supra note 7, at 492.
See Richard Wolf, Nearly All Supreme Court Justices Are Millionaires, USA TODAY (June
20, 2014), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/06/20/supreme-court-justicesfinancial-disclosure/11105985/ (finding that eight of the nine Supreme Court justices in 2014 were
millionaires, with Justices Breyer and Ginsburg being worth between $5 and $20 million each).
331
See David Hawkings, Wealth of Congress: Richer Than Ever, But Mostly at the Very Top,
ROLL CALL (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.rollcall.com/news/hawkings/congress-richer-evermostly-top (finding that the wealth of the median member of Congress was more than five times
higher than the wealth of the median American).
332
See Andrias, supra note 7, at 492.
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333
334

See supra Section VI.A.
See supra Section VI.D.

335

Federal district courts would have subject matter jurisdiction to hear challenges to the
Amendment under the federal question doctrine since the claim would “aris[e] under” the
Constitution. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West 2019) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”).
336

See Daniel P. Tokaji, Public Rights and Private Rights of Action: The Enforcement of
Federal Election Laws, 44 IND. L. REV. 113 (2010) (describing how the Supreme Court has been
reluctant to permit private plaintiffs to bring suits to enforce federal laws unless the statute clearly
creates a private right of action).
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right to challenge laws or rules that are alleged to violate this Amendment. In
effect, it creates an explicit private right of action to enforce the Amendment.
This ought to overcome any doubts about whether a private action is permitted.337
But, a bigger problem is the Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence.
Current standing rules would likely pose an obstacle to enforcement of this
Amendment.338 So this provision creates a new standing rule for those who wish
to challenge a law that they believe does not comply with this Amendment.
“Standing is the determination of whether a specific person is the proper
party to bring a matter to court for adjudication.”339 Under current standing rules,
a person has standing to challenge a statute only if they “have been or will
imminently be” injured by that statute.340 Thus, a person may not challenge a law
or rule simply because they are opposed to it.341 The Supreme Court has also
stated that the standing inquiry is “especially rigorous” when the case involves a
question of whether an act by another branch of the federal government is
constitutional.342 The Court’s standing doctrine, however, has been widely
criticized as incoherent and flawed.343
The current approach to standing, with its focus on a showing of concrete
harm to a particular plaintiff, presents a problem when dealing with “public”
issues such as wealth inequality.344 Who will have standing to challenge a law

337

See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 279–80 (2002) (quoting Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1981)) (noting that a private right of action will
exist when the text of the statute unambiguously confers the right to sue on individuals).
338
See infra text accompanying notes 344–348.
339

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 60.
Id. at 53; see also Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (explaining that
standing doctrine requires that the plaintiff suffer an “injury in fact” that is “actual or imminent”
(citations omitted)).
340

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562–65 (finding that the plaintiff’s intention to visit a site that might be
adversely affected by an agency decision at some indeterminate point in the future failed to satisfy
the requirement of an actual or imminent injury).
342
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819–20 (1997).
341

343

See e.g., Elise C. Boddie, The Sins of Innocence in Standing Doctrine, 68 VAND. L. REV.
297, 300 (2015) (“Scholars have long criticized the incoherence of standing doctrine . . . .”); Daniel
E. Ho & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing Doctrine? An Empirical Study of
the Evolution of Standing, 1921–2006, 62 STAN. L. REV. 591, 591 (2010) (observing that “standing
doctrine is one of the most widely . . . criticized doctrines in U.S. law”); Gene R. Nichol, Jr.,
Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301, 309 (2002) (“Injury
determinations have been marked by a breathtaking inconsistency.”). Professor Nichol’s article
contains a particularly exhaustive list of the literature that is critical of the standing doctrine.
Nichol, Jr., supra, at 302 n.4.
344
See Andrias, supra note 7, at 491 (arguing that implementing heightened judicial scrutiny
of laws that increase the concentration of wealth would be difficult, in part because “[i]ndividuals
or organizations interested in the future implications of a case, but not in the judgment itself,
generally lack standing and receive inadequate consideration”); see also Susan Bandes, The Idea
of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 279–80 (1990) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s focus on the
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that increases inequality? Take, for instance, a law that eliminated the estate tax.
The elimination of the estate tax would harm society generally by permitting
greater intergenerational accumulation of wealth and increasing wealth
inequality.345 But, it would be hard to identify a particular person who has
suffered a concrete injury as a direct result of the statute. Most of the people
directly affected by the law would have benefited from it because they would not
have had to pay the estate tax on their inheritance. The people who would be
harmed by it would be distant and suffer harms not directly from the elimination
of the estate tax but from the increase in wealth inequality and the various public
health and societal harms that eventually causes. A plaintiff alleging that they
would eventually be harmed (along with millions of others) by higher levels of
violent crime and reduced life expectancies caused by an increase in wealth
inequality resulting from the elimination of the estate tax would have a hard time
establishing the concrete harm necessary to sue under the current rules.346 Such
a plaintiff might also have difficulty with the Court’s “general grievance”
cases.347
This does not mean that no plaintiffs would have standing under the
present rules. For example, a statute that increased taxes on the poor and middle
class to pay for tax cuts for the wealthy, would likely provide standing for poor
and middle-class plaintiffs to sue. They would be able to show both that wealth

“pecuniary and property rights of individuals” has resulted in a standing doctrine that devalues
“widely shared constitutional or other collective injuries”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability,
Remedies and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1,
3–7 (1984) (noting how the Supreme Court’s standing doctrine makes it difficult for plaintiffs who
seek to “represent shared interests in enforcing lawful conduct” by the government); Patti A.
Meeks, Justice Scalia and the Demise of Environmental Law Standing, 8 J. LAND USE & ENVTL.
L. 343, 362–64 (1993) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s focus on individual rights and
individualized harm makes it difficult for plaintiffs who wish to vindicate a public interest in lawful
government action); Kellis E. Parker & Robin Stone, Standing and Public Law Remedies, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 771, 771 (1978) (discussing the difficulties of using traditional standing rules in
cases that involve “public interests in public actions”); Tokaji, supra note 336, at 114 (criticizing
the Supreme Court’s “myopic focus” on individual harm in election law cases because “federal
election statutes are not solely aimed at protecting the individual right to vote . . . , [but] also aim
to serve systemic interests in a fair election process”).
345
See supra Part III (describing the enormous adverse consequences of high levels of wealth
inequality).
346
See supra text accompanying notes 339–341 (noting that current standing rules require an
actual or imminent injury in fact); see also Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408–14
(2013) (holding that plaintiffs did not have standing to enjoin government surveillance because it
was not certain that they would be harmed in the future by that surveillance).
347
See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–74 (1992) (“We have consistently held
that a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government—claiming only harm
to his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking
relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large—does not
state an Article III case or controversy.”).
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inequality increased as a result of the statute and that they had suffered a direct
and concrete harm (higher taxes and lower after-tax income) as a result.
This hypothetical tax law might be a somewhat unusual statute, however.
The 2017 Tax Act, even though it directs most of its benefits to the wealthy,
actually decreases taxes for almost everyone. According to the Tax Policy
Center’s analysis, the Tax Act resulted in after-tax income increases for every
quintile, even though the largest gains went to those in the 95th to 99th
percentile.348 So, even for a statute, like the 2017 Tax Act, that clearly increased
inequality, it might be hard to find anyone who had suffered a sufficient “harm”
under the present standing rules. This is a significant problem as it would be
much harder to achieve the goal of the Amendment if statutes that increased
inequality could not be challenged because nobody had standing.
Thus, this Article proposes a new standing approach that takes into
account the public nature of the problem of wealth inequality.349 The key to
standing under this Amendment should not be whether a particular plaintiff can
identify a concrete and imminent harm to themselves, but rather whether they
would adequately represent the interests of the public in preventing excessive
levels of wealth inequality.350 Because of the complexity and cost of this type of
public litigation, in many cases, it will be institutions or organizations that are
best placed to represent the public interest, rather than individuals.351
Thus, the Amendment permits individuals or organizations to challenge
the constitutionality of a statute or rule if they can show that they would fairly
and adequately represent the interests of the public in opposing excessive wealth
inequality.352 The concept of “fair and adequate representation” is borrowed from
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See Analysis of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, supra note 266.
Actually, this approach is not entirely novel; it has just never been adopted by the Supreme
Court. Something similar was proposed in the 1970s as a way to reduce standing rules as an
obstacle to public interest litigation. See, e.g., Parker & Stone, supra note 344.
349

350
See id. at 775 (arguing that the key to standing in public litigation should be the ability of
the plaintiff to adequately represent the interests of the public); see also id. at 771 (“While the
interest of the plaintiff is essential to the prosecution of private actions, the public nature of public
action minimizes the importance of the role played by traditional plaintiffs . . . .”); Mark V.
Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663, 700 (1977)
(arguing that the proper role of the standing doctrine should be to ensure that the plaintiff is able
to adequately present the case).
351
See Parker & Stone, supra note 344, at 772 (noting that “institutional litigators,” such as the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, were instrumental in prosecuting key civil-rights actions).
352
Cf. Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated
as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943) (concluding that Congress could confer on “any non-official person
or a designated group of non-official persons” the authority to bring a suit on behalf of some public
interest). In Ickes, Judge Frank said that “[s]uch persons, so authorized, are, so to speak, private
Attorneys General.” Id.
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Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs class actions.353
In many ways, the class representatives in a class action fulfill a similar function
to the plaintiffs in an action brought under this Amendment—they represent the
interests of a large number of people who do not have the incentive or the
resources to litigate the matter on their own but who have an interest in the
outcome of the litigation.354 Thus, it makes sense to subject the representative of
the public interest under this Amendment to the same standards as the class
representative in class action litigation.
Borrowing from jurisprudence about Rule 23, it follows that to be an
adequate representative, the plaintiff must be willing to vigorously prosecute the
public interest in opposing excessive wealth inequality.355 Moreover, the plaintiff
must be represented by qualified counsel and have the resources to litigate a
complex matter against the government.356 If those criteria are met, then the
plaintiff has standing to challenge the law or rule in question under this
Amendment. To the extent that they conflict with this or impose additional
requirements, the Supreme Court’s current standing rules357 are not applicable to
suits under this Amendment. A body of law that has been used in, in practice, to
“systematically favor[] the powerful over the powerless”358 should not constrain
an amendment specifically designed to break the stranglehold of the wealthy over
the government.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article’s conclusions are dramatic. The level of economic
inequality the U.S. is currently experiencing represents an existential threat to
our society and democracy. The U.S. performs significantly worse than most of
the countries that most Americans think of as being our peers. By most measures,
the U.S. is now a worse place to live than almost all of Europe. We have more
crime, lower life expectancies, and lower life satisfaction. In fact, the countries

353
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (“One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all members only if . . . the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.”).
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Cf. Parker & Stone, supra note 344, at 772 (proposing that public law litigation be viewed
more like class action litigation).
See, e.g., Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace, & Agr. Implement Workers of Am. v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 497 F.3d 615, 626 (6th Cir. 2007).
355
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Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1) (requiring the court to consider whether the class
counsel has knowledge of the substantive law, experience handling complex litigation, and the
resources to represent the interests of the class).
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See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
See Nichol, Jr., supra note 343, at 304 (“[T]he standing rulings of the past three decades
demonstrate that the injury standard is not only unstable and inconsistent, but it also systematically
favors the powerful over the powerless. The malleable, value-laden injury determination has
operated to give greater credence to interests of privilege than to outsider claims of disadvantage.”).
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that look most like the U.S. today are highly unequal countries like Chile and
Russia.
These outcomes are a predictable consequence of our high levels of
inequality. In study after study, high levels of economic inequality are linked to
various ills, including higher crime rates, higher drug use rates, higher infant
mortality rates, lower rates of economic growth, lower life expectancies, and
lower social cohesion. The U.S. is not just unlucky or different. The society we
have now is exactly what one would expect given that we have the highest levels
of inequality of any advanced democracy.
Moreover, the wealthy have essentially captured the government and
ensured that it acts to protect and enhance their wealth. The majority of
Americans have been largely unable to alter government policies favoring lower
taxes on the wealthy over the last several decades despite the fact that only a tiny
percentage of Americans have benefitted from those policies. According to many
political scientists, there is something decidedly broken about our democracy.
Taken together, these conclusions justify amending the Constitution.
This Article proposes embedding in the Constitution an obligation on the federal
government to estimate the impact on wealth inequality of all future laws and
rules. The Amendment would prevent the government from passing a law or
adopting a rule that increases wealth inequality unless the government can show
that it is narrowly tailored to achieve an important governmental purpose. This
would largely prevent the government from further increasing wealth inequality
in the U.S. In fact, in the long run, it would almost certainly result in a gradual
decrease in inequality. And if we can significantly reduce wealth inequality there
is a good chance that hundreds of millions of Americans will live longer,
healthier, and more satisfied lives. We could, through this change, make our
society a measurably better place to live for virtually everyone.

